# Embedded Systems Hacking and My Plot To Take Over The World

Version 2.0

What are we going to do tonight, Brain?



...TRY AND TAKE OVER THE WORLD!

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#### Who am I?

- I had this really boring slide about who I am
- Then I realized that's not really who I am
- What follows is the "Powerpoint" version of "a little about me"...



PaulDotCom Security Weekly

http://www.pauldotcom.com





#### Podcast





- 2005 Present
- ~ 200 episodes
- Awards, blah
- Thursdays 7PM EST



PaulDotCom Security Weekly http://www.pauldotcom.com

m.com



#### Hack Naked

HACK NAKED













Why Hack Naked?



#### Computer Destruction













#### PaulDotCom



John "Father John" Strand



Paul "Salad Shooter" Asadoorian Larry "Dirty Uncle" Pesce





Mick "Jr. Salad Shooter" Douglas



"Byte\_Bucket"





Mark Baggett



Carlos "DarkOperator" Perez



Darren "Girly Mustache" Wigley



Mike "The Original Intern" Perez



#### "Hail Nessus!"

- My day job: I work for Tenable Network Security as a "Product Evangelist"
- I use Tenable products and write blogs, publish podcasts, teach courses, and produce videos
- http://blog.tenablesecurity.com





# Recently we released an iPhone app

### Looking for Nessus?



Find Jesus?

#### Taking Over The World

- Many have tried
- No one truly successful
- What are the three things you need to take over the world?
  - Yes, I've spent time thinking about this
- All geeks like deal with "specifications" and "Requirements"



### Requirements For World Domination

1. **Money** - You need to buy stuff, like armies, countries, pay people off, etc...



2. **Power** - You need the ability to use those resources to influence & control people



3. **Stealth** - If everyone knows about your plan, it is doomed from the beginning





### Using Embedded Systems To Make Money

- **Video games** Most are involved in commerce and network connected
- **Entertainment** Apple TV/iTV, Roku, all link back to your credit card somehow
- **Wireless routers** Route your traffic when doing online banking, Paypal, Ebay, etc...
- Printers/Fax How many times have you printed sensitive information?












#### Using Embedded Systems To Gain Power

- Network traffic (e.g. information) flows through them
- Information = Power
  - The ability to manipulate information is powerful
- Multiple computers can be controlled at once





#### Using Embedded Systems To Gain Power

 Embedded systems are an integral to controlling water, electricity, and sewage treatment



- See research from Josh Wright (<a href="http://www.willhackforsushi.com">http://www.willhackforsushi.com</a>) and Travis Goodspeed (<a href="http://travisgoodspeed.blogspot.com">http://travisgoodspeed.blogspot.com</a>/)
- "Advanced Metering Infrastructure Attack Methodology" from Inguardians





# Benefits To Targeting Embedded Systems - Stealth

- No one pays attention to them until they are broken
- Security is left out to save resources, make it easy, and money (as is logging)
  - Vendors are focused on profit, which also never equals security
  - Competition has driven vendors to cut costs to make products cheaper
- Potentially no interactive user (mouse/ keyboard)





### Benefits Of Targeting Embedded Systems - Stealth

- Embedded systems contain vulnerabilities that go unnoticed because everyone looking for them does not have every device that was ever made
- Thats not to say you can't get them or scan the Internet to find them
- "Can you send me a free router in exchange for some security testing?"



#### They Are Everywhere

SSID Stats (top 1000)				
SSID	Total	Percent		
<no ssid=""></no>	2032613	7.722%		
linksys	1925156	7.314%		
NETGEAR	590105	2.242%		
default	571273	2.170%		
Belkin54g	255678	0.971%		
no_ssid	215143	0.817%		
Wireless	214047	0.813%		
hpsetup	190005	0.721%		
DLINK	145280	0.551%		
WLAN	110940	0.421%		
home	93809	0.356%		
ACTIONTEC	86900	0.330%		
<hidden ssid=""></hidden>	72714	0.276%		
Free Public WiFi	68135	0.258%		
smc	54086	0.205%		
BTOpenzone	44859	0.170%		


#### Manufacturer Stats

Manufacturer	Total	Percent
Linksys	2785856	10.584%
D-Link	1345793	5.113%
Cisco	1198187	4.552%
Dell	902170	3.427%
Netgear	828954	3.149%
Belkin	468182	1.778%
2wire	454750	1.727%
Symbol	315140	1.197%
Apple Computer	235942	0.896%
Alpha Networks	208211	0.791%
SMC	202054	0.767%
Lucent	201312	0.764%
Trend	190876	0.725%
Intel	174874	0.664%
Askey	169671	0.644%
Orinoco	165133	0.627%
Buffalo	145722	0.553%
Avaya	145717	0.553%


http://wigle.net/gps/gps/main/ssidstats



#### In Places Like Boston



### Or Maybe Brussels...



#### And They Are Vulnerable...

Researchers scanning the internet for vulnerable embedded devices have found nearly 21,000 routers, webcams and VoIP products open to remote attack. Their administrative interfaces are viewable from anywhere on the internet and their owners have failed to change the manufacturer's default password.

<u>http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/vulnerable-devices/#ixzz0foWysVrp</u>



"The researchers have provided ISPs with their findings in the hope that they will do something to protect vulnerable customers."



### And No One Wants To Be Responsible For Them

Chen said he contacted Time Warner's security department four weeks ago and was told that the company was aware of the security vulnerability but "cannot do anything about it."

Time Warner's Dudley says the SMC8014 modem/routers are just a small portion of the **I4 million devices** its customers are using.

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/time-warner-cable/



### What if "Bob" Scanned the Internet?

- Use Google, find most popular ISPs that provide cable modem routers to users (or other interesting devices)
- Use ARIN to discover the IP address ranges assigned to those ISPs
- Use Nmap to discover all devices that have port 80 open and identify the service/banner
- Manually poke through results and see what you find
  - Or automate something to find vulnerabilities, exploit them, and upload custom configurations and/or firmware



### Example Vulnerabilities We Could Look For

- Wireless Routers TONS of FAIL on the Internet
  - Default, weak, or missing passwords are COMMON
  - Linksys HNAP Information leakage and lame denial of service with no mitigation
- Printers JetDirect authentication weaknesses, HP Multifunctions, Lanier printer information disclosure
- Roku Player Entertainment device



### Shodan is Handy For Exploring The Inernet

#### A known vulnerability or poor implementation in "Huawei" routers helps take over countries



» Top countries matching your search C	olombia	1,307
Ve	enezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	86
C	<u>hina</u>	30
<u>U</u>	nited States	13

201.244.139.14 Added on 16.02.2010

HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized

Server: micro\_httpd

Cache-Control: no-cache

A whois lookup returns Date: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 13:24:39 GMT comprehensive results WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Huawei SmartAX MT880"

Content-Type: text/html

Connection: close

## Scanning the Internet is Time Consuming

- Scanning the Internet is fun (so Bob tells me)
- It takes a long time, even when limiting to one port

```
# nmap --version-light --open --min-hostgroup 1024 -T4 -n
-PN -oG results.gnmap -sV -p 80 -iL isp.targetips
```

524288 IP addresses (32620 hosts up) scanned in 9769.46 seconds (2.7 hours)

2272512 IP addresses (2272512 hosts up) scanned in 135156.66 seconds (37.5 Hours)



### Finding Devices Without Scanning The Internet

- NTP could be used to identify devices
  - Example: <a href="http://carnal0wnage.blogspot.com/2010/04/">http://carnal0wnage.blogspot.com/2010/04/</a>
     network-time-protocol-ntp-fun.html
- DNS zone transfers from certain places reveal interesting results
- Brute-forcing DNS sub-domains can reveal hosts too
  - Example: <a href="http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/hacking-linksys-ip-cameras-pt-6/">http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/hacking-linksys-ip-cameras-pt-6/</a>



### NTP: All your ntp are point to us

- Netgear shipped thousands of routers in 2003 and pointed them to ntp1.cs.wisc.edu
  - http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~plonka/netgear-sntp/
- Issued firmware fix, but who does that?
- Routers still point to it, and thanks to HD Moore we can query it easily with metasploit
- Gives us a list of Netgear routers that Bob would attack



#### Metasploit NTP Module

```
msf > use auxiliary/scanner/ntp/ntp_monlist
msf auxiliary(ntp_monlist) > set RHOSTS ntpl.cs.wisc.edu
RHOSTS => ntpl.cs.wisc.edu
msf auxiliary(ntp_monlist) > run

[*1 Sending probes to 128 105 39 11 > 128 105 39 11 (1 bests)
```

```
[*] Sending probes to 128.105.39.11->128.105.39.11 (1 hosts)
[*] 128.105.39.11:123 205.237.147.11:23457 (128.105.39.11)
[*] 128.105.39.11:123 86.29.31.176:23457 (128.105.39.11)
[*] 128.105.39.11:123 209.192.117.17:23457 (128.105.39.11)
[*] 128.105.39.11:123 70.54.203.193:60128 (128.105.39.11)
[*] 128.105.39.11:123 222.254.78.74:10001 (128.105.39.11)
```

Lots of DSL/Cable
Providers on the list
What are chances
these users have
not updated
firmware?

```
71.161.67.98 domain name pointer adsl-67-161-71.shv.bellsouth.net.
76.72.108.68 domain name pointer ip68-108-72-76.lv.lv.cox.net.
117.131.29.65 domain name pointer CPE-65-29-131-117.wi.res.rr.com
45.21.110.76 domain name pointer c-76-110-21-45.hsd1.fl.comcast.net
61.195.100.98 domain name pointer rrcs-98-100-195-61.central.biz.rr.com.
164.133.254.76 domain name pointer adsl-76-254-133-164.dsl.skt2ca.sbcglobal.net.
```




### DNS Zone Transfer - MUCH faster!

This no longer works with the above domain since I accidentally published the information without sanitizing.


Check out Metasploit's "gather/dns\_enum" module written by Carlos Perez



#### Target specific devices




### Now that you've found them..



#### **DHCP Mode**

Use this page to configure DHCP.



Apply Reset


Copyright © 2005 All Rights Reserved.

Diagnostic


Firmware Upgrade

Statistics

#### This Required NO PASSWORD



### The Password Is Already There!






#### This Gets Scary


- A certain ISP based in Turkey left default or blank passwords on seemingly every router
- This helps in our plot for world domination:
  - 1. Target geographic regions, exploit vulnerabilities exposed by that particular ISP+Cable Modem combo
  - 2. Change DNS servers and control user's "Internets"
  - 3. Change passwords and lock out user and ISP (not too stealthy)
  - 4. More stealthy: Upload new firmware to provide new functionality (like password logging, SSL MiTM, etc...)




## EPIC WIN!



## EPIC WIN FAIL!




# Can we at least get a USERNAME with a password!



# Multifunction Devices Do EVERYTHING

- Print, scan, fax, copy, email, wash my car, write my TPS reports, pick up the dry cleaning, bring me beer...
- Most devices can be accessed without authentication:
  - I tested this internally on a few networks
  - "Bob" tested this against millions of hosts on the Internet
- Zscaler made a post as well:
  - <a href="http://research.zscaler.com/2010/08/corporate-espionage-for-dummies-hp.html">http://research.zscaler.com/2010/08/corporate-espionage-for-dummies-hp.html</a>





PaulDotCom Security Weekly

#### BIKRAM YOGA BURR RIDGE Release Form

Name: E-mail Addres City:	l:	Phone Number:
State:		Zip Code:
Sex: M	MF bayer	Date of Birth:
How di	id you hear about us?	44
	edical issues we should know about?  ondition of my class participation at Bikram Y	Yors Burr Pidge Lagree to the following
(Please	initial in the boxes)	roga Dari Kinge, i agree to die ionowing.
	I have been examined by a licensed physicial found by such physician to be in good physician and perform during a I will faithfully follow all instructions given where, and how to perform and not to perform any deviation by me from such instructions a I will not hold you, your partners, or employ me causes whole or in part by my failure to be your instructors or by any physical impairmed writing.  I understand and acknowledge that I am to rewill not hold you, your partners, instructors of applicable to school of Yoga theory and exert	cal health and fully able to perform all Yoga my enrollment with you.  by you and your instructors as to when, m Yoga exercises, and being understood that shall be at my own risk.  ees responsible for any injuries suffered by aithfully follow the instructions of you and ent of mine not fully disclosed to you in secive in Yoga theory and exercise only and or employees to any higher standard of case
Signatur	re:	
Date:		the Alberta
		76.33





## LANIER MP C3500/LD435c Web Image Monitor

### Job History

Back



Function	⊞	No.	Us	er Name	File Name	Results	Page(s)	Quantity
		302	N B	g	Microsoft PowerPoint - The Demonization of Israel Aug22.08-03-2010.ppt [Compatibility Mode]	Completed	46	1
		301	N B	g	Microsoft PowerPoint - The Demonization of Israel Aug22 08-03-2010.ppt [Read-Only] [Compatibility Mode]	Completed	43	1
		301	N B	g	Microsoft PowerPoint - The Demonization of Israel Aug22.07-27-2010.ppt [Compatibility Mode]	Completed	24	1
		303	N B	g	2010 (Dec'09-Dec'10) Donations Received.08-02-2010 SortedbyAlpha_RMF.xls	Completed	6	2
		302	N B	g	POP_Poster.pdf	Completed	1	1
		301	N B	g	donations	Completed	6	2
		0	?		UPO 23 - R s.xlk	Cancelled		
		301	N B	g	israel_trip (3) finalpdf.pdf	Completed	40	20
		0	?		israel_trip (3) finalpdf.pdf	Cancelled		
		306	N B	g	Student Brochure_Combined_III 07-27-2010.pub	Completed	20	10

## Someone left a printer exposed to the Internet and now I know....


### [WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM GOOGLE]

- The person's name, where they work, which department they work in
- Their area of study (Jewish studies)
- Potentially when they are taking a trip
- What applications they run (Powerpoint, Excel, PDF reader, MS Publisher)
  - Not the same version of Powerpoint that created the document
- They accept donations & promote Isreal
- UPO-23 = Electronic Hourly Employee Timecard for student mentor



## Can I have your USB stick?

Yes.



## Roku



press up press down press left press right press select press home press fwd press back press pause

# nc 192.168.1.240 8080 D0C9DP009064 ETHMAC 00:0d:4b:4c:29:5e WIFIMAC 00:0d:4b:4c:29:5f >

http://forums.roku.com/viewtopic.php?
t=20106&sid=f0702e3bbba722ac7f1a59307209782c



## World Domination Propaganda



http://www.i-hacked.com/content/view/274/48/



### Even More Attacks

- HD Moore found several flaws in VxWorks, scanned 3.1 billion IP addresses and found 250,000 systems exposed to the Internet
  - http://blog.metasploit.com/2010/08/vxworksvulnerabilities.html
- Craig Heffner discovered a DNS rebinding attack on several routers allowing attackers to gain control of administrative interfaces
  - http://code.google.com/p/rebind/



## Even More Attacks (2)

- Ki-Chan Ahn and Dong-Joo Ha created malware for Nintendo Wii and DS systems
  - http://games.venturebeat.com/2010/07/31/live-demos-ofhacking-the-nintendo-ds-and-the-wii-to-spread-malware/
- Barnaby Jack remotely attacked two different ATMs and "made the money come out" (without a card+pin #)
  - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwMuMSPW3bU



## Potential Linksys Vulnerability

- Reported to Cisco PSIRT Feb 17, 2010
- HNAP request can crash admin web server on certain models with certain firmware versions
- Low impact vulnerability discovered by accident while trying to send a valid request
- The HNAP request format was taken directly from Cisco's own documentation



## Curl Rules

```
curl http://192.168.1.70:80/HNAP1/ -v --basic \
--user admin:admin -H \
'SOAPAction: "http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/
GetWLanRadioSecurity"' \
--data @xml/GetWLanRadioSecurity.xml
```

```
<!xml version="I.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope>
<soap:Body>
<GetWLanRadioSecurity xmlns="<a href="http://purenetworks.com/HNAPI/" />
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
```

## Lame?

- Turns out to not be reproducible (my router was a DD-WRT upgrade)
- Certainly lame. However shows just how fragile these devices and protocols are
- What would happen if you were to actually fuzz HNAP?
- Release notes of firmware running on device say "Fixed HNAP issue"
- However, there is no way to disable HNAP



# But Seriously, What Do We Do About It?

- I can show you embedded systems security fail until you are tired of hearing about it (which was probably 15 minutes ago or longer)
- I could go out and find more vulnerabilities and talk about them
- Some problems are implementation-based, nevermind a Oday (e.g. no HNAP disable)
- So how do we fix it?





## www.securityfail.com

## www.securityfail.com

- Used to redirect to ww.grc.com (Gigidy)
- It is now a public Wiki where people can write miniarticles on security failures
- First major section will be dedicated to embedded systems
- Write-in about how embedded security has failed you
  - ODays are okay too, but not sure that will help
- Raise awareness and work to change the industry to implement better security on devices



## www.securityfail.com

### Some GOALS to get us started:

- We want vendors of embedded systems to:
  - FORCE the user to select the password
  - Allow users to disable protocols
  - Only enable secure management protocols by default (HTTPS, SSH)
- We want ISPs to:
  - Block inbound port 80 on user subnets
  - Manage customer devices properly and implement security



## Sign up for an account

- Email me if you want an account in the mean time
- Or just send me your stories anonymously
- This is a non-profit project
  - Its sole purpose is to raise awareness and hopefully work with the industry to change



### Buffalo:WBR2-G54

#### Default username disclosure

When HTTP Basic auth fails for the admin web console on this device a message is displayed which reveals the administrator username to be root.

```
Password Error.

Enter the password regarding following tips.

* Enter a user name as [root].

* The password is upper/lower case sensitive.
```

The admin console may be accessible on the WAN side of the device and the default password is null.



### Belkin:F5D7633 1.00.000

#### Contents [hide]

- 1 Password Leakage
- 2 Configuration Leakage
- 3 Authentication Bypass
- 4 XSS
- 5 DoS

### Password Leakage

In the source of mainlogin.html the password for all three types of account can be found in the small chunk of JavaScript within the <head> tags.

### Configuration Leakage

- Browse to <router\_ip>/user.conf for a full dump of the user configuration that includes network keys, Allowed MAC addresses, passwords, PPPoE/etc credentials & firewall entries. No authentication required.
- Connecting to the router through telnet and running dumpcfg will output the configuration of the router, as above.

### Authentication Bypass

Authentication can be bypassed by visiting following URL: <router\_IP>/Timelogout.cgi?usrUserName=pass. Exchange 'pass' with 'fail' to log off.



# So what about World Domination?



## TAKING OVER THE WORLD

There's an app for that.



# Things I wanted to cover but ran out of space

- The "Chuck Norris" worm, which could a version of the psyb0t?
- Static analysis of device firmware, mounting the filesystems, finding vulnerabilities
- Analyzing video game systems, Tivo, and Blue-Ray players as they are network connected
- Wireless type worms and default Wifi settings
- Segmentation is just a band-aid



## Don't Forget: http://www.securityfail.com

- **Presentations:** <a href="http://pauldotcom.com/">http://pauldotcom.com/</a>
  <a href="presentations.html">presentations.html</a>
- Radio: <a href="http://pauldotcom.com/radio">http://pauldotcom.com/radio</a>
- Live Stream: <a href="http://pauldotcom.com/live">http://pauldotcom.com/live</a>
- Forum: <a href="http://forum.pauldotcom.com/">http://forum.pauldotcom.com/</a>
- Mailing List: <a href="http://mail.pauldotcom.com">http://mail.pauldotcom.com</a>
- Webcasts: <a href="http://pauldotcom.com/webcasts">http://pauldotcom.com/webcasts</a>
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- Email: psw@pauldotcom.com





