OSXCollector

Automated forensic evidence collection & analysis for OS X

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
whoami

- Joined Yelp security team in July 2014.
- Mostly involved in malware incident response.
- Also working on automating our security processes.
- Previously worked at SAP in Sophia Antipolis (France) in the Security & Trust research group.
- Graduated in 2011 from AGH University of Science and Technology in Kraków (Poland) and Telecom ParisTech/Institut Eurecom (France).



Yelp's Mission:

Connecting people with great local businesses.






Yelp Stats:

As of Q2 2015










68%



>3k employees, most of them using Macs














https://github.com/Yelp/osxcollector





OSXCollector is easy to run

- 1 Python file
- 0 dependencies

```
$ sudo osxcollector.py --id DelayedHedgehog
Wrote 35394 lines.
Output in DelayedHedgehog-2015_01_20-19_38_38.tar.gz
$
```



Megan Carney @PwnieFan · Jan 13

Best line from **osxcollector** documentation: "Get creative with incident names, it makes it easier to laugh through the pain."







2





The output is JSON

JSON is beautiful.
JSON is easy to manipulate.

```
"file path": "/System/Library/Extensions/Apple iSight.kext/Contents/MacOS/Apple iSight",
"sha2": "19b7b85eaedb17d9565dce872f0d1ea8fc0761f508f28bedcc8606b828cbf614",
"sha1": "99005b68295c202fd359b46cd1411acea96b2469",
"md5": "b8cc164b6546e4b13768d8353820b216",
"ctime": "2014-12-05 16:50:39",
"mtime": "2014-09-19 00:16:50",
"osxcollector section": "kext",
"osxcollector incident_id": "DelayedHedgehog-2015_01_20-19_38_38",
"osxcollector plist path": "/System/Library/Extensions/Apple iSight.kext/Contents/Info.plist",
"osxcollector_bundle_id": "com.apple.driver.Apple iSight",
"signature chain": [
  "Software Signing",
  "Apple Code Signing Certification Authority",
  "Apple Root CA"
```

OS X stores lots of data in SQLite DBs

```
# Dump a sqlite DB in a dozen lines of code
with connect(sqlite_db_path) as conn:
    conn.cursor.execute('SELECT * from sqlite_master WHERE type = "table"')
    table_names = [table[2] for table in tables.fetchall()]

for table in table_names:
    rows = conn.cursor.execute('SELECT * from {0}'.format(table_name))
    column_descriptions = [col[0] for col in conn.cursor.description]
    for row in rows.fetchall():
        record = dict([(key, val) for key, val in zip(column_descriptions, row)])
```



plist == property list

sometimes binary, sometimes plain text

```
BINARY
$ /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c print shell.plist
Dict {
    ProgramArguments = Array {
        /usr/libexec/rshd
    Sockets = Dict {
        Listeners = Dict {
            SockServiceName = shell
    Disabled = true
    Label = com.apple.rshd
    SessionCreate = true
    inetdCompatibility = Dict {
        Wait = false
```

```
$ cat ssh.plist
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0</pre>
//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.
dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
     <key>Disabled</key>
     <true/>
     <key>Label</key>
     <string>com.openssh.sshd</string>
     <key>Program</key>
     <string>/usr/libexec/sshd-keygen-
wrapper</string>
     <key>ProgramArguments</key>
     <array>
           <string>/usr/sbin/sshd</string>
           <string>-i</string>
```

OSXCollector uses Foundation

Foundation is a *nice* Objective-C wrapper.

```
import Foundation
# Look! Incredibly long objc style function names!
plist_nsdata, error_message = Foundation.NSData.dataWithContentsOfFile_options_error_(
                              plist path, Foundation.NSUncachedRead, None)
# Seriously, incredibly long function names!
plist_dict, _, _ = Foundation.NSPropertyListSerialization. \
                   propertyListFromData_mutabilityOption_format_errorDescription_( \
                   plist nsdata, Foundation.NSPropertyListMutableContainers, \
                   None, None)
```



Forensic Collection

OS System Info

Applications

Web Browser Info

Kernel **Extensions** Quarantines

Email Info

Downloads

Groups & Accounts

Startup Items

Common keys in entries

path, hashes, timestamps, signature chain, ...

```
"file path": "/System/Library/Extensions/Apple iSight.kext/Contents/MacOS/Apple iSight",
"sha2": "19b7b85eaedb17d9565dce872f0d1ea8fc0761f508f28bedcc8606b828cbf614",
"sha1": "99005b68295c202fd359b46cd1411acea96b2469",
"md5": "b8cc164b6546e4b13768d8353820b216",
"ctime": "2014-12-05 16:50:39",
"mtime": "2014-09-19 00:16:50",
"osxcollector section": "kext",
"osxcollector incident id": "DelayedHedgehog-2015 01 20-19 38 38",
"osxcollector plist path": "/System/Library/Extensions/Apple iSight.kext/Contents/Info.plist",
"osxcollector bundle id": "com.apple.driver.Apple_iSight",
"signature chain": [
 "Software Signing",
  "Apple Code Signing Certification Authority",
  "Apple Root CA"
```

Startup items run on boot

Malware running at startup is basically game over.

```
"osxcollector_section": "startup,
"osxcollector_subsection": "launch_agents", PRETTY PRETTY PRETTY PRETTY PRETTY PRETTY PRETTY AT 215 May 16 and 1026 aea499fd47e21ffeb95f9597aca", PRETTY AT 215 May 16 and 1026 aea499fd47e21ffeb95f9597aca", PRETTY AT 215 May 16 acafe4468ff2e2 Try AT 215 May 16 acafe4468ff2e2 Try AT 215 May 17 acafe4468ff2e2 Try AT 215 May 17 acafe4468ff2e2 Try AT 215 May 18 aca
     "file path": "/Library/Application Support/GPGTools/uuid-path
     "ctime": "2014-12-05 16:52:00",
     "mtime": "2014-11-30 15:49:40",
     "osxcollector plist": "/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ssh.plist",
     "program": "/usr/libexec/sshd-keygen-wrapper",
     "label": "com.openssh.sshd",
     "signature chain": [],
      "osxcollector incident id": "DelayedHedgehog-2015 01 20-19 38 38",
```



Timestamps are important in forensics

Timestamps get stored in a lot of ways.

OSXCollector normalizes them.

```
"file path": "/System/Library/Extensions/Apple iSight.kext/Contents/MacOS/Apple iSight",
"sha2": "19b7b85eaedb17d9565dce872f0d1ea8fc0761f508f28bedcc8606b828cbf614",
"sha1": "99005b68295c202fd359b46cd1411acea96b2469",
"md5": "b8cc164b6546e4b13768d8353820b216",
"ctime": "2014-12-05 16:50:39",
"mtime": "2014-09-19 00:16:50",
"osxcollector_bundle_id": "com.apple.driver.Apple.
"signature chain": [
 "Software Signing",
  "Apple Code Signing Certification Authority",
  "Apple Root CA"
```

Hashes are still important in forensics

```
"file path": "/System/Library/Extensions/Apple iSight.kext/Contents/MacOS/Apple iSight",
"sha2": "19b7b85eaedb17d9565dce872f0d1ea8fc0761f508f28bedcc8606b828cbf614",
"sha1": "99005b68295c202fd359b46cd1411acea96b2469",
"md5": "b8cc164b6546e4b13768d8353820b216",
"ctime": "2014-12-05 16:50:39",
"osxcollector_plist_path": "/System/Library/Extensions/Apple_iSight.kext/Contents/Info.plist",
"osxcollector bundle id": "com.apple.driver.Apple iSight",
"signature chain": [
  "Software Signing",
  "Apple Code Signing Certification Authority",
  "Apple Root CA"
```



Quarantines track downloaded content

They live forever in a plist.

```
Safari downloaded this file today at 2:47 PM from
                                                                           www.example.com.
"osxcollector section": "quarantines",
                                                                   (?)
                                                                             Show Web Page
                                                                                               Cancel
                                                                                                        Open
"osxcollector username": "jsendor",
"LSQuarantineAgentName": "Google Chrome",
"LSQuarantineAgentBundleIdentifier": "com.google.Chrome",
"LSQuarantineDataURLString": "https://cachefly.alfredapp.com/Alfred 2.5.1 308.zip",
"LSQuarantineEventIdentifier": "6FA87446-1249-4578-83E4-4BBCF7AEA4A3",
"LSQuarantineOriginURLString": "http://www.alfredapp.com/",
"osxcollector db path": "/Users/ivanlei/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2",
"osxcollector table name": "LSQuarantineEvent",
"osxcollector incident id": "DelayedHedgehog-2015 01 20-19 38 38",
"LSQuarantineTimeStamp": "2014-12-05 14:40:33"
```



"Example" is an application downloaded from the Internet. Are you sure you want to open it?

xattr-wherefrom

No need to search around in browser history.

```
"md5": "0b984ecc39d5b33e4f6a81ade4e8dbf1",
"xattr-quarantines": [
  "0001;5541127e;Google Chrome;63B2C485-1F64-4ADE-A95C-72F7087FA172"
"signature chain": [],
"xattr-wherefrom": [
  "http://trojans.evildownloads.com/Trojan.app",
  "http://trojans.evildownloads.com/latest-trojans/"
"osxcollector_incident_id": "DelayedHedgehog-2015_01_20-19_3
"file_path": "/Users/jdoe/Downloads/Trojan.app",
```



OS X doesn't care if startups and kext are signed

But I kinda do, so OSXCollector lists the signature chain.

```
"osxcollector section": "startup",
"osxcollector subsection": "launch agents",
"md5": "dbd251d8a6e4da2419d75f5b18cf5078",
"sha1": "bbb8016ad1026aea499fd47e21ffeb95f9597aca",
"sha2": "9c89666fd071abd203f044ab7b3fd416decafe4468ff2e20a50b6d72f94809e2",
"file path": "/Library/Application Support/GPGTools/uuid-patcher",
"ctime": "2014-12-05 16:52:00",
"mtime": "2014-11-30 15:49:40",
"osxcollector plist": "/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ssh.plist",
"program": "/usr/libexec/sshd-keygen-wrapper",
"label": "com.openssh.sshd",
"signature_chain": [],
                                                                                                    SWELL | SWELL 
"osxcollector_incident_
```



Forensic collection is hard work.

Forensic analysis is fun.

Part science, part art.





Manual analysis with **grep** and **jq** works pretty well

grep a time window

```
$ cat foo.json | grep '2014-01-01 11:3[2-8]'
```

only urls in a time window

```
$ cat foo.json | grep '2014-01-01 11:3[2-8]' | jq 'select( has("url")).url'
```

grep a single user







We can automate this!

step 1: analyze

step 2: ???


step 3: profit

```
$ python -m osxcollector.output filters.analyze -i osxcolletor output.json
== Very Readable Output Bot ==
Let's see what's up with this machine.
Well, here's some domains OpenDNS wouldn't recommend.
- quarantines
 LSQuarantineDataURLString: "http://d2.genieo.com/im/partners/webpic2/installgenieo.
dmg?campaign=wbpc 1&download browser=Chrome"
  LSQuarantineTimeStamp: "2014-04-30 15:26:13"
 opendns-categorization: {"status": 0, "content categories": ["Adware"], "suspicious":
True, "security categories": []}
 opendns-security: {"dga score": -6.35631605112, "rip score": 0.0, "asn score": 0.0,
"securerank2": -0.00813742053751, "attack": "", "prefix score": 0.0, "found": True,
"threat type": ""}
 opendns-link: "https://investigate.opendns.com/domain-view/name/w.genieo.com/view"
 firefox history
 last visit date: "2015-01-11 23:44:56"
 url: "http://dl.pspvideosdownload.com/lp/?appid=12..."
 vtdomain-domain: "dl.pspvideosdownload.com"
 vtdomain-detections: {"undetected referrer samples": 0,
"detected downloaded samples": 2, "detected referrer samples": 0, "detected urls": 100.
"detected communicating samples": 0, "undetected communicating samples": 0}
```


Enter OSXCollector Output Filters



Automated analysis with output filters



Automated analysis with output filters




find domains filter

```
{
    "url": "https://biz.yelp.com",
    "osxcollector_domains": [
        "biz.yelp.com",
        "yelp.com"
]
}
```

a lot of filters add a single piece of info



Automated analysis with output filters



check blacklist filter

```
{
  "url": "https://www.evil.com",
  "osxcollector_domains": [
    "www.evil.com",
    "evil.com"
}
  domain_blacklist.txt
  evil.com
  streaming-football.com
  downloads.com
```



Match any key.


"url": "https://www.evil.com",
"osxcollector_domains": [
 "www.evil.com",
 "evil.com"
],
"osxcollector_blacklist": [
 "domains"
]

Regex or exact match.

Built in smarts for turning domains into regex.




Automated analysis with output filters



VirusTotal hash lookup filter

API output filter base does the heavy lifting.
Support for rate limits & response caching issues10s of requests at once.

Automated analysis with output filters



OpenDNS related domains filter

```
{
  "url": "https://www.evil.com",
}
```

```
{
  "url": "https://www.evil.com",
  "osxcollector_related": {
    "domains": [
        "double-evil.com",
        "free-lunch.org",
        "torrent-malware.net"
    ]
  }
}
```


Judge domains by the company they keep.

Domains related to suspicious domains are usually

suspicious themselves.



Automated analysis with output filters




OpenDNS domain reputation filter

Premium Cyber Threat Intel (CTI)

```
"url": "https://www.evil.com",
           SANS DFIR
                                               Following
           @sansforensics
      The term CTI is the new APT @robtlee
     #CTISummit #ThreatIntel
```

```
"url": "https://www.evil.com",
"osxcollector opendns": {
 "domain": "evil.com",
 "security": {
   "found": true,
    "dga score": -3,
    "securerank2": -23,
    "asn score": -57,
    "prefix score": -62,
    "rip score": -99,
```

Automated analysis with output filters




Recommend next steps

```
This whole things started with just a few clues. Now look what I found.
- downloads downloads
  ctime: "2015-02-02 12:15:14"
  file path: "/Users/jdoe/Downloads/screenshot.scr"
  mtime: "2015-01-16 19:20:06"
  xattr-quarantines: ["0001;54b95657;Google\x20Chrome;162C4043-647D-44A8-83C2-2B1F69C7861F"]
  xattr-wherefrom: ["https://evildownloads."
com/docs/securesc/5552gjr0llks3i1r65nm9vjn073v4ahg/82mfdn9k8qmvmo3ta2vja6hta3iink5i/1421431200000/002186363
34715341180/12229357981017199890/0B-HDNU1GNnRAVjBtYlBqdVFrT2s?
e=download&h=01562916784096941731&nonce=850uav3g55qiu&user=12229357981017199890&hash=78ffvfobh7rreq0bj86hqf
hb7i8eq921", ""]
  related-files: ["screenshot.scr"]
Nothing hides from Very Readable Output Bot
If I were you, I'd probably update my blacklists to include:
  domain: "evildownloads.com"
```



That might just help things, Skippy!

Automated analysis with output filters



Threat Intel API

https://github.com/Yelp/threat_intel

Query Threat Intel Feeds:









Call OpenDNS API endpoints

```
from threat intel.opendns import InvestigateApi
investigate = InvestigateApi(<INVESTIGATE-API-KEY-HERE>, cache file name="/tmp/cache.opendns.json")
domains = ["google.com", "baidu.com", "bibikun.ru"]
investigate.security(domains)
  "baidu.com": {
   "found": true,
    "dga score": ∅,
    "rip score": 0,
```




ElastAlert

http://engineeringblog.yelp.com/

Yelp Engineering @YelpEngineering · 16h
Things get weird at scale. See how we stay on top of it using @elastic and our flexible alerting system, ElastAlert engineeringblog.yelp.com/2015/10/elasta...







https://github.com/Yelp/osxcollector

Lemme know if you use it.
Send pull requests.



Questions? Let's talk!

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@jsendor





