

WAVESTONE

DYODE: Do Your Own DiodE

A DIY, low-cost data diode for ICS

BruCon, October 2017 Arnaud Soullié

Who are we?



Arnaud



- / Pentest & research
- / Interests
 - / Windows Active Directory
 - / ICS security
 - / Wine tasting / Motorbike riding (we're not going to talk about it today)
- / Talks & workshops
 - / BlackHat Europe 2014
 - / Hack In Paris 2015
 - / BruCon 0x07
 - / BSides Las Vegas 2015 / 2016
 - / DEFCON 24 / 25 (ICS VILLAGE)

Manager @ WAVESTONE




Ary

- / Advisory & audit (used to do pentests)
- / Interests
 - / Windows Security
 - / Cryptophony
- / Talks: IEEE ICC 2009, JSSI 2013 and 2014, SSTIC 2016, Bsides Las Vegas 2016
- / Book Information Security, Eyrolles Edition [in French] – written with several authors including Arnaud

Tax exile @ \$Big4 in Switzerland;)

ICS 101




DATA DIODES 101

/ AKA "one-way gateway"

/ Use of light as the transport medium

- / PN junction prevents electrons from going backwards
- → Security property is backed by physics. *Hack that*.



COMMERCIAL DATA DIODES









WHY THIS PROJECT?

- / Feedback from lots of ICS security assignments
- → There are lots of needs for exchanging information between CORP and ICS
- / Commercial data diodes exist, but are quite expensive
- → Security / cost trade-off, not easy to sell
- / Examples
 - Predictive maintenance: send a 100kb file every 6 hours to a 3rd party Cooling units: 3rd party needs to access a PLCs output in real-time for efficiency improvement
- → Data only needs to be exchanged one-way, but in these examples the high cost of a commercial Data Diode combined with business needs to exchange information, resulted in uncontrolled network connection between two networks

DYODE PROJECT

- / Based on existing work: Lagadec, Austin Scott, Robert Gabriel
- / Low cost & DIY


 Use of standard hardware (COTS) and open-source software

 Target cost of 200\$ per unit
- Objectives
 Proof of Concept
 Transparent, easy to deploy solution
 Share the results

DYODE project has no commercial intent, but an implementation by a vendor is authorized


HARDWARE

- / Use of copper-optical converters
- / Use of a 3rd converter to fake a signal on the second (link failure protection)
- / Raspberry Pis used for the "in" and "out" counters






HARDWARE



HARDWARE




SOFTWARE




DEMO


[VIDEO] DEMO TIME!

DEMO







FILE TRANSFER WORKFLOW



MODBUS TRANSFER WORKFLOW



SCREEN SHARING WORKFLOW




CONFIGURATION FILE

```
config name: "Dyode test"
config version : 1.0
config date: 2016-05-04
dyode in:
 ip: 10.0.1.1
 mac: b8:27:eb:89:1e:f3
dyode_out:
 ip: 10.0.1.2
 mac: b8:27:eb:b1:ff:ab
modules:
  "File share 1":
    type: folder
    port: 9600
     in: /home/pi/in
     out: /home/pi/out
```

```
"Modbus PLC":
  type: Modbus
  port: 9400
  ip: 192.168.1.150
  port out: 502
   registers:
    - 0-100
    - 400-450
  coils:
    - 0-10
    - 100-110
  "Screen share 1":
  type: screen
  port: 9900
  in: /home/pi/screenz
  out: /home/pi/screenz
```

REAL COST

Component	Quantity	Cost
Raspberry Pi + power supply	2	92€
Copper-Optical converter	3	117€
Optical cable	2	15€
USB-Ethernet adapter	4	16€
Rack 19" 2U	1	59€
Screens	2	70€
Buzzer	1	5€
GRAND TOTAL		374€






WHY NOT JUST CUT THE CABLE?

Cutting the cable?

- Yes, it is possible to have a one-way gateway by using half-duplex mode on network interfaces and cutting the 2 RX of the Ethernet cable
- / Seems simpler than the DYODE implementation



However


- / You'll still need the "in" and "out" counters (Raspi) to use a one-way connection for TCP protocols
- / In theory, advanced attacks may allow to send information the other way around, for example by switching ports "up" and "down"

IMPROVEMENTS > Reducing the cost

Most expensive components : in/out counters & optical converters
→ Let's change that !




Replace classical RSPi by RSPi 0 (5\$) (When you can find one...)




Replace the Ethernet-FO converters by a serial connection with an optocoupler also called photocoupler


- / Diode opto-isolator = LED + photodiode
- / Very low cost solution (2€)
- / Acceptable bandwidth for some usages (20ko/s)
- / For very sensitive environments, do your own




DYODE Ultra-low cost version

Component	Quantity	Cost
Raspberry Pi 0 + power supply + SD Card	2	32€
Optocoupler+capacitor+misc.	1	5€
MicroUSB-Ethernet adapter	2	30€
DIN Rail compatible box	1	12€
GRAND TOTAL		80€






DYODE v2 final prototype



Hardware is open source as well!




```
*PADS-PCB*

*PART*
U1 DIP--8
IN HDR-3X1/2.54
[...]
C2 CAP-D5.0XF2.0

*NET*

*SIGNAL* U1_2
IN.2 U1.2
[...]
*END*
```

Netlist




```
solid stl_item0 facet
normal 0 0 1 outer loop
vertex -56.25 23.799 9
vertex -56.5 24.232 9
vertex -56.561 23.561 9
endloop endfacet facet
normal 0 0 1 outer loop
vertex -55.112 21.051 9
vertex -54.982 20.568 9
[...]
```

STL file for 3D-printing the case

DEMO


[LIVE] DEMO TIME!

DEMO



SO, IS IT MAGICAL?

- / Nope.
- / Most of the time, need to exchange data two ways:
 - / CORP -> ICS for updates, docs
 - / ICS -> CORP to export production data
- / So you'll end up with two data diodes, one in each direction, which goes a bit against the principle...





THREAT MODELING (SIMPLIFIED)

What does DYODE guarantees?

No data will go from OUT to IN. That's all. Period.



What attacks are still possible?

The overall security of the solution still relies on logical hardening.

If the "out" corner is not secured, it might be possible for an attacker to

- / Perform a Denial of Service
- / Compromise the Raspi and modify the data

LIMITS





- / Low speed, a few mbs
- / High latency caused by flat file transfer
- → Replaced by a naive, native Python sockets implementation

Side channels



- / Side channels, especially based on electromagnetic leaks (TEMPEST) were not taken in consideration in the threat model
- / However, EM leaks can be reduced with faraday cages → Re-use of forensics (relatively low cost) portable faraday cages used when handling phones?



Gateway hardening

- / In and out gateways are not especially hardened and can be compromised
- / The target it only to prevent information flowing from ICS to CORP

Not compatible with safety-critical environments (yet)

Roadmap

Modbus/S7 integrity control

 Acting as an application firewall in whitelist mode to check the correctness of the parameters

Link status monitoring - Heartbeat

 Ex: Using a cronjob + a SNMP trap on the receiver side

File integrity checking (1/2)

- Level1: perform a file validation by the receiving gateway, either with an AV (basic) or a specific parser/converter such as Lagadec's Exefilter or CIRCLean or against specific hashes for binaries
- Level2: use a dedicated device for file parsing which can be further hardened (the exposition can be limited to the parsing component, the TCP/IP stack and a limited number or entry points)
- Level3: Use Qubes OS throwable VM

Other protocols


 Add support for SNMP, Syslog, CIFS, SMTP, FTP, SFTP, etc

Traceability of the transfers

- Level1: generate hash of the files/values transferred
- Level2: use 2 DYODE and 3 RSPi (in, out and crypto-signer); the RSPi in the middle combined with an OpenPGP card can generate the hashes and add a signature

Current deployments


- / Similar setup, different implementation (.NET) made by one of our clients
- / Used in a summer internship for Virginia Space #ohmygawddyodeintospace https://github.com/EBUJOLD/data-diode



/ Tests in progress at another client to isolate safety PLCs from the DCS


32

Conclusion





https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/dyode





Arnaud SOULLIE

Arnaud.SOULLIE@wavestone.com

wavestone-advisors.com @wavestone_