

A faded, dark-toned background image of Tom and Jerry from the cartoon 'Tom and Jerry'. Tom is on the left, looking towards Jerry on the right. The image is semi-transparent, allowing the text to be clearly visible.

# LOLDOCS: Sideloading in Signed Office files

OUTFLANK


clear advice with a hacker mindset

# About Dima

**Dima van de Wouw** @DaWouw

Red Teamer and Offensive Developer

Enjoys building things that break things and using them in operations




# About Pieter

**Pieter Ceelen** @ptrpieter

Red Teamer & Offensive R&D

I am an MS Office power-user and like clicking all buttons



# INTRO



- Companies moving to 'signed macro's'
- We located a vulnerability in a Microsoft signed document
- What other vulnerabilities are there?
- This is about Office, not only as a phishing vector
- Not everything is patched, in process of disclosing




A cartoon illustration of Tom the cat from Tom and Jerry. He is shown from the chest up, looking down with a mischievous expression at Jerry the mouse. Jerry is hanging from a string that Tom is holding in his right hand. The background is a dark, muted green with a subtle grid pattern.

# Hardening Against Macro's

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
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# SETTINGS: ONLY DIGITALLY SIGNED MACROS




# OFFICE GUI BEHAVIOUR


## Unsigned document - No warning - No execution




## Self-signed document - Yellow bar - User executed



# SETTINGS: REMOVE THE MESSAGE BAR




## Self-signed document – No warning - No execution







# XLA/XLAM - EXCEL ADD-INS

## Unsigned xlam - No warning - No execution




## Self-Signed xlam - No bar but a dialogue - User executed


## Transpose XLSM->XLAM





# SETTINGS: ADD-IN CONFIGURATIONS



Now opening a Self-Signed XLA/XLAM...  
Still a dialogue!!



# BLOCKING XLA/XLAM FILES – FOR GOOD!



# RELEVANCE & RECAP

## Takeaways

- XLAM's are cool
- Settings are complex, companies will fail




A faint, stylized illustration of Jerry the mouse from the cartoon Tom and Jerry is visible in the background, appearing to be in a dynamic pose as if running or jumping. The entire slide has a teal background with a white dot grid pattern.

# Pattern 1: Read from cells - MS signed XLAMs

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# SIGNED BY MICROSOFT



Contains Macros  
Valid signature  
Timestamp signed

# VARIABLE VALUES IN CELLS

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Excel interface with the 'Formulas' tab selected. A table is displayed in the worksheet, and a VBA code snippet is overlaid on the right side. Red arrows point from the code to specific cells in the table.

	A	B
1		
2		
3	MacDirSep	:
4	WinDirSep	\
5	_Longname	-
6	_Demandload	
7	_ReadOnly	FALSE TRUE
8	XLLName	ANALYS32.XLL
9	Resource	[FUNCRES.XLA]RES
10	LibPathWin	\LIBRARY\ANALYSIS
11	LibPathMac	:Macro Library:Analysis Tools
12	errmsg.XLLNotFound	Cannot find ANALYS32.XLL. Please run Setup to install Analysis ToolPak.
13	SummaryText	VBA Functions for Analysis ToolPak.
14		
15		
16		

```
1 ' ANALYSIS TOOLPAK - Excel AddIn
2 ' The following function declaration
3
4 ' These variables point to the correct
5 Const XLLNameCell = "B8"
6 Const MacDirSepCell = "B3"
7 Const WinDirSepCell = "B4"
8 Const LibPathWinCell = "B10"
9 Const LibPathMacCell = "B11"
```

Red arrows indicate the mapping from the VBA code to the table cells: MacDirSepCell points to cell B3, WinDirSepCell points to cell B4, and XLLNameCell points to cell B8.

# FLOW TO LOAD AN XLL

```

298 ' Setup & Registering functions
299
300 Sub auto_open()
301     Application.EnableCancelKey = xlDisabled
302     SetupFunctionIDs
303     PickPlatform
304     VerifyOpen
305     RegisterFunctionIDs
306 End Sub
307

```

- Code runs on open
- XLLName is obtained from cell B8
- Code loads XLL using RegisterXLL function with XLLName as input

```

1 ' ANALYSIS TOOLPAK - Excel AddIn
2 ' The following function declarations provide interface between VBA and ATP XLL.
3
4 ' These variables point to the corresponding cell in the Loc Table sheet.
5 Const XLLNameCell = "B8"
6 Const MacDirSepCell = "B3"
7 Const WinDirSepCell = "B4"
8 Const LibPathWinCell = "B10"
9 Const LibPathMacCell = "B11"
10
11 Dim DirSep As String
12 Dim LibPath As String
13 Dim AnalysisPath As String
14 Dim WorkbookName As String
15
Private Sub VerifyOpen()
328 XLLName = ThisWorkbook.Sheets("Loc Table").Range(XLLNameCell).Value
329 theArray = Application.RegisteredFunctions
330 If Not (IsNull(theArray)) Then
331     For i = LBound(theArray) To UBound(theArray)
332         If (InStr(theArray(i, 1), XLLName)) Then
333             Exit Sub
334         End If
335     Next i
336 End If
337
338 Quote = String(1, 34)
339 ThisWorkbook.Sheets("REG").Activate
340 WorkbookName = "[" & ThisWorkbook.Name & "]" & Sheet1.Name
341 AnalysisPath = ThisWorkbook.Path
342
343 AnalysisPath = AnalysisPath & DirSep
344 XLLFound = Application.RegisterXLL(AnalysisPath & XLLName)
345 If (XLLFound) Then
346     Exit Sub
347 End If
348
349 AnalysisPath = ""
350 XLLFound = Application.RegisterXLL(AnalysisPath & XLLName)
351 If (XLLFound) Then
352     Exit Sub
353 End If
354
355 AnalysisPath = LibPath
356 XLLFound = Application.RegisterXLL(AnalysisPath & XLLName)
357 If (XLLFound) Then
358     Exit Sub
359 End If
360
361 XLLNotFoundErr = ThisWorkbook.Sheets("Loc Table").Range("B12").Value
362 MsgBox (XLLNotFoundErr)
363 ThisWorkbook.Close (False)
364 End Sub

```



# PRACTICAL ABUSE

```
298 ' Setup & Registering functions
299
300 Sub auto_open()
301     Application.EnableCancelKey = xlDisabled
302     SetupFunctionIDs
303     PickPlatform
304     VerifyOpen
305     RegisterFunctionIDs
306 End Sub
307
```

B8

```
320 Private Sub VerifyOpen()
321     XLLName = ThisWorkbook.Sheets("Loc Table").Range(XLLNameCell).Value
322     theArrav = Application.RegisteredFunctions
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339 AnalysisPath = ""
340 XLLFound = Application.RegisterXLL(AnalysisPath & XLLName)
341 If (XLLFound) Then
342     Exit Sub
343 End If
```

Original B8=  
ANALYS32.XLL

PoC 1 - B8=  
demo64.dat


Success: Different extension, XLL loads!

PoC 2 - B8=  
= "demo" & IF(ISERROR(SEARCH("64";INFO("OSVERSION"))); "32"; "64") & ".dat"

Success: Formulas work!

demo64.dat for x64, demo32.dat for x86 process!

# DEMO



# RECAP

- Microsoft signed XLAM depended on cell contents
  - RegisterXLL (Load XLL) & ExecuteExcel4Macro (Excel4 abuse)
- Using signed files 'out of context'
- Owned if you had MS as 'trusted publisher'
- Patch for CVE-2021-28449
  - Fix input validation
  - No signing downgrade: Unsigned XLL's are not loaded from signed VBA
  - Complex: Files are timestamp signed, no easy option to revoke
  - Microsoft also patched other files...

**Open question: What other vulnerable signed files are there!**



# More Signed Files

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# LOCATING SIGNED CONTENT

## What Are the Best Excel Add-ins?

- XLTools.
- Ablebits.
- Professor Excel Tools.
- Peltier Tech Charts for Excel.
- Analysis Toolpak.

6 Jan 2022

<https://answers.microsoft.com/msoffice/forum/all>

### Excel startup alert for missing SaveAsAdobePDF.xlam


15 Feb 2021 · 2 posts

Go to the Tools menu to select Excel Add-Ins. If you have the Developer tab displayed you can use the Excel Add-Ins tool located there. Clear ...

<https://www.ibm.com/docs/planning-analytics/topi...>

### Planning Analytics for Microsoft Excel - .xll file as an add-in to ...

Download the Planning Analytics for Microsoft Excel .xll file from IBM Support Fix Central ...



The screenshot shows a VirusShare analysis interface. At the top, a green circle with '0' indicates no detections. A green checkmark and text state: 'No security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious'. The file name 'MsoScroll.xla' is highlighted with a red box. Below it, a list of detected features includes 'auto-open', 'environ', 'exe-pattern', 'macros', 'run-dll', and 'xls'. The 'DETECTION' tab is active, showing 'Basic Properties' with a table of hashes and file type.

Property	Value
MD5	a86fc07f61f45ec67041715e68037a51
SHA-1	77a2b25721731c749db596f2302becf92e9d6975
SHA-256	86a2f89562dd74eabd9be52b73e0a085e5400c5cc221f9e0cf49f1aa01c4bde5
Vhash	3961ca1c3797ccf510b9214e9dd7e94d
SSDEEP	384:2rZVLhP4Tn9yHKJDVomiSV0UO7E3C2glB+a+yytyvhheokN:2rTLh4ooCuOiCD3RyyJbD
File type	MS Excel Spreadsheet



## Internal recon

# SOME INTERESTING FILES?

Type	Keyword	Description
AutoExec	auto_open	Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened
AutoExec	Workbook_Open	Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened
AutoExec	auto_close	Runs when the Excel Workbook is closed
AutoExec	Workbook_BeforeClose	Runs when the Excel Workbook is closed
AutoExec	cmdCancel_Click	Runs when the file is opened and ActiveX objects trigger events
AutoExec	AutoColor_RangeName_Change	Runs when the file is opened and ActiveX objects trigger events
Suspicious	Environ	May read system environment variables
Suspicious	environment	May read system environment variables
Suspicious	ExpandEnvironmentStrings	May read system environment variables
Suspicious	Open	May open a file
Suspicious	write	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	put	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	output	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	Binary	May read or write a binary file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	CopyFile	May copy a file
Suspicious	CopyFolder	May copy a file
Suspicious	Kill	May delete a file
Suspicious	CreateTextFile	May create a text file
Suspicious	Shell	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	vbNormal	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	vbNormalFocus	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	WScript.Shell	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	run	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	ShellExecute	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	ShellExecuteA	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	shell32	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	create	May execute file or a system command through WMI
Suspicious	command	May run PowerShell commands
Suspicious	Call	May call a DLL using Excel 4 Macros (XLM/XLF)
Suspicious	Application.Visible	May hide the application
Suspicious	ShowWindow	May hide the application
Suspicious	MkDir	May create a directory
Suspicious	CreateObject	May create an OLE object
Suspicious	GetObject	May get an OLE object with a running instance
Suspicious	ExecuteExcel4Macro	May run an Excel 4 Macro (aka XLM/XLF) from VBA
Suspicious	Windows	May enumerate application windows (if combined with Shell.Application object)
Suspicious	FindWindow	May enumerate application windows (if combined with Shell.Application object)
Suspicious	Lib	May run code from a DLL
Suspicious	RtlMoveMemory	May inject code into another process
Suspicious	SetTimer	May run a shellcode in memory

~ 60K lines of VBA...  
Hits all OLEVBA warnings  
is legit...

# Pattern 2: Declare & DLL hijack



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# ABUSING DECLARES - PATCHED IN CVE-2021-28449

```
-----  
VBA MACRO SolverCalls.cls  
in file: xl/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'VBA/SolverCalls'  
-----  
Option Explicit  
  
#If VBA7 Then  
Private Declare PtrSafe Function Solv Lib "Solver32.dll" (ByVal object, ByVal app, ByVal wkb, ByVal x As Long)  
#Else  
Private Declare Function Solv Lib "Solver32.dll" (ByVal object, ByVal app, ByVal wkb, ByVal x As Long)  
#End If  
  
Public UDF As String  
  
Function Solve(x As Long) As Long  
    Dim strCurDir As String  
    strCurDir = CurDir  
    ChDir (ThisWorkbook.Path)  
    ChDrive (ThisWorkbook.Path)  
    Solve = Solv(Me, Application, ThisWorkbook, x)  
    ChDir (strCurDir)  
    ChDrive (strCurDir)  
    If IsError(Solve) Then Solve = 9  
    If x = 0 Then GlobalAnswer = Solve  
End Function
```

1: Function  
declared from  
external DLL

2: Current path is changed to workbook path  
3: Declared function executed (=DLL load)



# ABUSING DECLARES & SEARCH ORDER

```
#If VBA7 Then
Private Declare PtrSafe Function F.....GetKey Lib ".....addin.dll" (ByVal section As String, ByVal key As String, ByR
#Else
Private Declare Function l.....GetKey Lib ".....addin.dll" (ByVal section As String
#End If
'''
Private Const Msk As Long = &H10101010
Dim Lookup As Object
```

If SafeDllSearchMode is enabled, the search order is as follows:

1. The directory from which the application loaded.
2. The system directory. Use the [GetSystemDirectory](#) function to get the path of this directory.
3. The 16-bit system directory. There is no function that obtains the path of this directory, but it is searched.
4. The Windows directory. Use the [GetWindowsDirectory](#) function to get the path of this directory.
5. The current directory.
6. The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable. Note that this does not include the per-application path specified by the **App Paths** registry key. The **App Paths** key is not used when computing the DLL search path.



Without the VBA directory changes  
tried to abuse similar declares, but initially failed..

11:37:49.5533814	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\.....dll
11:37:49.5539757	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\vfs\System\.....dll
11:37:49.5545194	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System\.....addin.dll
11:37:49.5548929	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\vfs\Windows\.....addin.dll
11:37:49.5551282	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System\.....addin.dll
11:37:49.5553915	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\vfs\Win.....addin.dll
11:37:49.5556216	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Windows\.....addin.dll
11:37:49.5560749	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Users\user\Documents\.....addin.dll
11:37:49.5567227	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\.....addin.dll
11:37:49.5570064	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\vfs\System\.....dll
11:37:49.5572559	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\.....dll
11:37:49.5574883	x	EXCEL.EXE	6196	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\vfs\Windows\.....dll

Document is on desktop, searches in "documents" folder. Why?




# SEARCH ORDER IN OFFICE



# MANIPULATING THE DOCUMENTS DIRECTORY

## Social engineering

Make sure that the user places the provided files in the 'documents' folder



## Technical engineering


Startup flags can manipulate the searchpath (e.g. send .lnk)

*/p workbook path*

Specifies a folder as the active working folder (for example, the folder that is pointed to in the **Save As** dialog box).

### Example

```
excel.exe /p "c:\My Folder"
```



# MITIGATIONS ON DECLARES

```
Private Declare Function Solv Lib "Solver32.dll" (ByVal object, ByVal app, ByVal wkb, ByVal x As Long) As Long
Private Declare Function SetDllDirectory Lib "kernel32.dll" Alias "SetDllDirectoryA" (ByVal lpNewDirectory As String) As Boolean
Private Declare Function GetDllDirectory Lib "kernel32.dll" Alias "GetDllDirectoryA" (ByVal cBufferLength As Long, ByVal lpOldDirectory As String) As Long
#End If

Public UDF As String

Function Solve(x As Long) As Long
    Solve = 9 'Default error value
    Dim strCurDir As String

    Const cMaxPathBuffer = 1024
    Dim strBufDllDirectoryPrev As String * 1024
    Dim strDllDirectoryPrev As String
    Dim cDllDirectoryPrev As Long
    cDllDirectoryPrev = GetDllDirectory(cMaxPathBuffer, strBufDllDirectoryPrev)
    If (cDllDirectoryPrev = 0) Then
        If (Err.LastDllError <> 0) Then
            'GetDllDirectory failed
            GoTo Done
        End If
    ElseIf (cDllDirectoryPrev >= cMaxPathBuffer Or cDllDirectoryPrev < 0) Then
        'GetDllDirectory truncated its result or overflowed on cast from unsigned
        GoTo Done
    End If


    strDllDirectoryPrev = Left(strBufDllDirectoryPrev, InStr(strBufDllDirectoryPrev, Chr$(0)) - 1)

    strCurDir = CurDir
    Dim sDllPath As String
    sDllPath = Application.LibraryPath & Application.PathSeparator & c_sSolverFolder
    Dim fSetDirectory As Boolean
    fSetDirectory = False
    ChDir (sDllPath)
    ChDrive (sDllPath)
    fSetDirectory = SetDllDirectory(sDllPath)

    Solve = Solv(Me, Application, ThisWorkbook, x)
```

Microsoft patch for Solver:

1. Get current working dir
2. Chdir to application.librarypath
3. Call the function from external DLL
4. Chdir to the 'original path' from step 1



# Pattern 3: Abuse Loading of Documents

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

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# ABUSE LOADING OF DOCUMENTS - APPLICATION.RUN

```
If Not (rng Is Nothing) Then
  For Each c In rng.Cells
    If c.Formula Like "=BChart(*" Then
      'Debug.Print "Found =BChart()"
      cValues = Application.Run("E...xlsm!T...", c)
      If cValues(0, 10) = userData Then
        FindChartFormulaAndExtractValues = cValues
        Exit Function
      End If
    End If
  End If
End If
```

An XLAM being loaded via application.run






# ABUSE LOADING OF DOCUMENTS - OPEN DOC

```
Sub auto_open()  
    Worksheets.Open ("book3.xlsm")  
End Sub
```

Vulnerable or not?



# CROSS OFFICE APP FILE OPENING

**StackOverflow:** Excel instantiates Word and opens file

```
Sub RamsOpen2()  
  
Dim Doc  
Dim DocPath  
Dim DocObj  
Dim VarResult  
  
DocPath = "C:\Users\mariuszk\Desktop\cf10\RAMS.docx"  
Set DocObj = CreateObject("word.Application")  
Doc = DocObj.Documents.Open(DocPath)  
DocObj.Visible = True  
  
With Doc.ActiveDocument  
    Set myRange = .Content  
    With myRange.Find  
        .Execute FindText:="FindText", ReplaceWith:="Repla  
    End With  
End With  
  
VarResult = Doc.GetSaveAsFilename( _  
FileFilter:="DP Document (*.doc), *.doc, DP Document (*.dc  
initialvalue:"InitialDocument")  
  
End Sub
```

## Question

What methods to 'open a file' via VBA and what impact on 'macros running or not'

# CROSS OFFICE APP FILE OPENING

## Vulnerable

```
appWord.Run (ThisWorkbook.Path & "\doc1.docm!macro")
```

```
appWord.Documents.Open (ThisWorkbook.Path & "\doc1.docm")
```

Vulnerable when called with doc ,docm,..., not vulnerable when called with docx  
(note: a renamed docm->docx fails)

## Not vulnerable?

```
docu = appWord.Documents.Add(ThisWorkbook.Path & "\doc1.doc")
```

# OTHER MITIGATION DIRECTIONS

Can we disable macros while running macros?

One option seems to "Disable events"  
avoids autoopen, document\_open events from firing

## Application.EnableEvents property (Excel)

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True if events are enabled for the specified object. Read/write Boolean.



```
Sub auto_open()  
  
    Application.EnableEvents = False  
    Workbooks.Open ("book3.xlsm")  
End Sub
```

# THIS IS SUBTLE

```
Sub auto_open()  
  
    Application.EnableEvents = False  
    Workbooks.Open ("book3.xlsm")  
    Application.CalculateFull  
  
End Sub
```

Vulnerable or not?

```
Public Function solvie()  
    MsgBox "pwned from function solvie ;)"  
  
End Function
```





The background of the slide features a large, semi-transparent, blue-tinted image of Jerry the mouse from the cartoon Tom and Jerry. Jerry is depicted in a dynamic, expressive pose, with his mouth wide open as if laughing or shouting, and his hands raised near his face. The entire image has a fine grid of small white dots overlaid on it. In the bottom right corner, there is a smaller, more detailed illustration of Jerry in his natural brown color, appearing to be running or jumping towards the left.

# Pattern 4: XLL: Ghost DLL hijack

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
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# SIGNED XLLS


The screenshot shows a file explorer window with the address bar displaying `c:\users\user\desktop\expl\working\2.xll`. The left sidebar shows the file's structure, with `libraries (19) *` selected. The main pane displays a table of dependencies. A red box highlights the first three rows of the table, which are the only ones with a description of 'n/a'. The text 'Signed XLL' is written in red next to the file name in the address bar.

library (19)	flag (1)	bound (0)	type (1)	functions (739)	description
kernel32.dll	-	-	implicit	3	n/a
user32.dll	-	-	implicit	4	n/a
gdi32.dll	-	-	implicit	70	n/a
kernel32.dll	-	-	implicit	203	Windows NT BASE API Client DLL
user32.dll	-	-	implicit	222	Multi-User Windows USER API Client DL
gdi32.dll	-	-	implicit	97	GDI Client DLL
winspool.drv	-	-	implicit	3	Windows Spooler Driver
advapi32.dll	-	-	implicit	11	Advanced Windows 32 Base API
shell32.dll	-	-	implicit	10	Windows Shell Common Dll
ole32.dll	-	-	implicit	29	Microsoft OLE for Windows
oleaut32.dll	-	-	implicit	32	oleaut32.dll
ws2_32.dll	x	-	implicit	3	Windows Socket 2.0 32-Bit DLL
shlwapi.dll	-	-	implicit	9	Shell Light-weight Utility Library
gdiplus.dll	-	-	implicit	22	Microsoft GDI+
msimg32.dll	-	-	implicit	2	GDIEXT Client DLL
oleacc.dll	-	-	implicit	3	Active Accessibility Core Component
imm32.dll	-	-	implicit	3	Multi-User Windows IMM32 API Client C
winmm.dll	-	-	implicit	1	MCI API DLL
uxtheme.dll	-	-	implicit	12	Microsoft UxTheme Library

# XLL & SEARCH ORDER




Excel loads dlls from current dir, not in "documents"



# PRACTICAL EXPLOITATION – EXCEL BEHAVIOUR

If XLL has loading issues (e.g. DLL imports) then Excel generates an error and XLL content is shown in Excel








Solution:



- Function proxying
- exportstoc - <https://github.com/michaellandi/exportstoc>

# PRACTICAL EXPLOITATION

1: User gets an XLL and a bunch of DLL's (e.g. via zip, iso, etc)

 2	09/08/2022 07:23	Microsoft Excel XLL A...	5,642 KB
 [REDACTED].dll	09/08/2022 07:23	Application extension	10,068 KB
 [REDACTED].dll	08/09/2022 15:17	Application extension	117 KB
 [REDACTED]_ORI.dll	09/08/2022 07:23	Application extension	1,258 KB
 [REDACTED].DLL	09/08/2022 07:23	Application extension	14 KB

2: Starts add-in and e



3: Got Shell..



# MITIGATION

- Full paths for DLL's when possible  
(Not feasible on user selected paths/install dirs)
- Configure DLL loading via linker configuration e.g.  
`LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR`  
`LOAD_LIBRARY_REQUIRE_SIGNED_TARGET`
- Configure search order via `SetDefaultDllDirectories` function  
before `loadlibrary` calls (or linker `/DELAYLOAD` (Delay Load Import))

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-security>








A cartoon illustration of Tom and Jerry. Tom is a blue cat with a black bow tie, standing and looking down at Jerry. Jerry is a grey mouse with a white shirt and brown shorts, lying on the floor with a pained expression. The background is a simple room with a green wall and a white door. The entire image has a dark blue overlay with a white dot grid pattern.

# SUMMARY

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# COMMON VULNERABLE CODE PATTERNS

	Microsoft signed	Public samples signed	Public code / stack overflow
1. Code flow depending on cell contents			
2. VBA Declare Ghost DLL hijack			
3. Document loading			
4. XLL Ghost DLL hijack			

# TAKE AWAYS

## Blue teams

- Office Security settings are complex...
- LOLDocs: An attacker can use signed files out of application/installer context
- Reconsider your trusted publishers
- Code review prior to signing VBA code and XLLs and consider the listed attacks
- To timestamp or not? Revoking strategy?

# TAKE AWAYS

## Red teams

- There are many vulnerable public signed samples out there
- Revoking these files is hard! Typically no AMSI (runtimescanscope)
- When inside, check trusted publishers, download signed files

Initial access, lateral, long term persistence!

**MS Office: The product that keeps on giving!**



# LOLDOCS: Sideloading in Signed Office files



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