

Micro Attack Simulations Improving Cyber Resilience

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


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WHY WE'RE DOING THIS?

...

The Gap: Early-stage Organizations

Why Traditional Cybersecurity Methods Fall Short for Early-stage Organizations

Resource Constraints

- Limited staff dedicated to security
- Budget constraints make full-scale
 Red Teaming costly

Maturity Level

- Basic or nascent security controls
- Lack of well-defined processes and documentation


Skill Gap

- May lack in-house expertise for advanced threat detection and mitigation
- Limited experience in dealing with complex attacks

Time Sensitivity

- Need quick wins to prove the ROI (Return on Investment) of security measures
- Long periods for traditional Red Teaming might be impractical

How Organizations describe their Cybersecurity Maturity Levels




Classic 50:50 split with 50% of organizations below or at "Middle stage"

Source: "Cyber Resilient Organization Study 2021" by IBM based on Ponemon Institute Research Data https://www.ibm.com/resources/guides/cyber-resilient-organization-study/



"Let's be honest, most companies don't need a full blown red team, but still want to test procedures and reaction beyond traditional penetration testing."

— Unknown Source ;-)



WHAT ARE MICRO ATTACK SIMULATIONS?

Targeting specific Security Controls

Focused, Feasible, Actionable

"Bite-sized Assessments"

Definition

- Miniaturized and focused Red Team exercises
- Targeting single or multiple specific security controls

Different Control Types

- > Technical: Firewalls, IDS/IPS, encryption, etc.
- Non-Technical: Policies, escalation procedures, communication paths

Purpose

- Quick validation of implemented controls
- Identification of gaps in both technical and non-technical domains

Applicability

- Ideal for organizations with limited resources or expertise
- A stepping stone to more comprehensive assessments

Trying to break specific Security Controls

Instead of a full-blown Red Team approach

Identify security controls which are crucial to certain attack paths:

Usually via scenario-driven modeling approaches with different threat actors.

O2 Create attack simulations (esp. for "Single Points of Failures"):

No need to test controls that the model states as not (yet) implemented.

Focus on implemented controls most relevant to withhold an attack path.

Stage test cases, with initial access defined as per control to test.

No need to "penetrate" from outside towards the specific object.

Execute attack simulations:

Check expected outcome of a successful security control: (preventing access, stopping attack, triggering incident response processes, etc.)

Incorporate Red Team style under-cover techniques when detective controls are tested.




WHICH CONTROLS TO ATTACK?

Scenario-driven Attack-Tree Modeling



Define Threat Actors


Useful for Scenario-Driven Attack Paths



Likelihood of Occurrence


Define Attack Goals

With Impact on the Organization




Define Attack Paths leading to Goals

OR / AND Connected



Define Attack Paths leading to Goals

OR / AND Connected




Assign Actors & Complexity

At Leafs of the Tree to determine Likelihood

itle	Controls	Children	<u>Actor</u>	Complexity	Likelihood
1 × Actor: Hacktivist					
Malware via Phishing E-Mails	0/2	2 Sub	Hacktivist	Ordinary	Likely
4 × Actor: Attacker Group Outsid	e				
Orive-by Infection via Malicious Websites	0/2	0 Sub	Attacker Group Outside	Simple	Likely
Malware Installation on Temporarily Unlocked Device (on Travel)	0 / 1	0 Sub	Attacker Group Outside	Complex	Possible
Malware via USB Devices	0 / 1	0 Sub	Attacker Group Outside	Complex	Possible
Supply Chain Attack on Developer Desktop (Plugin, Dependency, etc.)	0 / 2	0 Sub	Attacker Group Outside	Very Complex	Unlikely


Add Security Controls to Nodes

The more towards the root, the more *generic* it is. The more towards the leafs, the more *specific* it is.




Different Controls have different Effects

Useful for simulating which Control Combos should be challenged



Define Validation Steps for Controls

Use these later as instructions for executing the Micro Attack Simulations...



Define Validation Steps for Controls


Making the execution of Micro Attack Simulations repeatable

Validation

- Use automated tools such as Microsoft's Active Directory Best Practices Analyzer (AD BPA) or third-party tools to scan and audit the Active Directory configuration.
- Manually review the configuration settings and compare them against industry best practices and security guidelines.
- Verify that the auditing and logging settings are correctly configured to capture relevant events and changes in the Active Directory environment.
- Ensure that the audit logs are being regularly monitored and reviewed for any suspicious activities or unauthorized changes.
- Test the effectiveness of the configuration audits by intentionally misconfiguring certain settings and verifying if they are identified during the audit process.
- Conduct periodic penetration testing or vulnerability assessments to identify any misconfigurations that might not be detected by the configuration audit alone.
- Regularly update and patch the Active Directory servers to address any known vulnerabilities or weaknesses that could be exploited by attackers.
- Document the results of the configuration audits and any steps taken to remediate identified issues.

Define which Controls are Implemented

Used to simulate which are the "Achilles Heels" for an Attack Path



Find "Single Points of Failure" & Combos

Using Monte Carlo Simulations of Implemented Controls to Break


2 Controls (excluding Singe Points of Failure) with high failure score when part of a combination:

Based on 21606 checked combos (pairs of two and three). Click on controls to flag them for further inspection.

Flag	ID	Title	Kind	Effort	Status	Score	
	C25	Backup and Recovery	Operations	Low	Implemented	100 %	
	C5	Network Segmentation	Operations	High	Implemented	100 %	

4 Singe Points of Failure

- Cloud Service Hardening
- Container Hardening (OWASP CSVS, CIS-Benchmarks, etc.)
- Regular Active Directory Configuration Audits
- Resource-based Data Encryption of Strictly Confidential Data





CREATING MICRO ATTACK SIMULATIONS

Trying to break the chosen Controls

Example: Abuse of AD Misconfiguration

Objective

Assess vulnerability to attacks targeting misconfigured AD to control the domain controller. Test effectiveness of PAM solution.

Controls

AD security settings, Best Practices Analyzer scans, PAM tools and their sensitivity.

Micro
Attack
Simulation

Utilizing techniques from the SpecterOps paper on "ESCALATE" (ESC1), aggressively exploit known and potential Active Directory misconfigurations to seize control of the domain controller.

Attempt to move enduser accounts into privileged groups to challenge PAM tools and intrusion detection capabilities.

Example: Covert Communication Channels

Objective

Evaluate the ability to detect and block covert malware communication via WebSockets and DNS.

Controls

Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), application-layer firewalls, DNS monitoring tools, Endpoint Protection (EDR/EPP).

Micro
Attack
Simulation

Deploy simulated malware (RAT, C2) using covert WebSocket and DNS channels from a compromised internal system to challenge the organization's detection and blocking capabilities.

Example: Unhindered Ransomware Spreading

Objective

Test the ability to detect custom-built advanced ransomware spreading from endpoints to servers.

Controls

Endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions, ransomware detection, heuristic analysis tools.

Micro
Attack
Simulation

Run custom-built ransomware designed to stealthily encrypt files (while preserving headers) on selected endpoints and servers (to simulate lateral movement) in timed intervals (to simulate spreading).

Example: Insufficient Crisis Management

Objective

Evaluate the organization's response to ransomware mails and "should've been detected" indicators of compromise on servers.

Controls

Crisis management procedures, incident detection and alerting mechanisms.


Micro
Attack
Simulation

Deploy ransom notes, trigger high-severity indicators of compromise, and send ransom emails to official channels.

Include proofs of breach (data excerpts and/or dropping IoCs) to test tracing and incident escalation procedures.

Scenario-based Attack Path Selection

Choose which nodes to skip and which to attack



Case Study — Involved Parties



White Team (Crisis Management)



Blue Team (SOC)




Press



Red Team (External)

Case Study: Attack Path Setup

- Customized Chisel
- DNS C2 endpoints in cloud
- Masqueraded domain for C2
- Access target server via VPN client (as per scenario)



Case Study — Event Types in Timeline



Event was detected and investigation was started.

Event was detected, but no investigation started.

Neither detection nor investigation.

9:30 AM CS Beacon executed through custom loader 9:15 AM 9:45 am Start of the exercise Chisel tunnel established

11:15 AM

Target servers not accessible — Executing AD enumeration

10:00 AM - 10:15 AM

Running all sorts of noisy "ransomware-like" tools and commands

1:15 PM

Found critical vulnerability allowing us to compromise AD

3:40 PM Added user to server admin group


3:30 PM

Executed attack on AD, domain

3:45 PM

Accessed target server, bypassing PAM solution

[2] Your data has been stolen and encrypted



>>>>> Your data has been stolen and encrypted.

If you don't pay the ransom, the data will be published on our TOR darknet sites. Keep in mind that once your data appears on our leak site, it could be bought by your competitors at any second, so don't hesitate for a long time.

The sooner you pay, the sooner your company will be safe.

To get the encrypted data back, transfer 40000 \$ in Bitcoin to the following address:

If you are unsure how to acquire and transfer the require Bitcoin, follow the instructions here: https://www.bitcoin.com/get-started/how-to-buy-bitcoin/

3:57 PM

Sent first ra to PoC, forv incident ma duty >>>>> What guarantee is there that we won't cheat you


We are the oldest ransomware affiliate program on the planet, nothing is more important than our reputation. We are not a politically motivated group, and we want nothing more than money. If you pay, we will provide you with the encryption software and destroy the stolen data. After you pay the ransom, you will quickly make even more money. Treat this situation simply as a paid training for your system administrators, beacause it is due to your corporate network not being properly configured that we were able to attack you. Our pentest services should be paid just like you pay the salaries of your system administrators. Get over it and pay for it. If we don't give you the decryptor or delete your data after you pay, nobody will pay us in the future!

>>>>>> You need to contact and decrypt one file for on tor darknet sites with your personal ID.

4:10 PM

Ransomware executed on server, all files in user directories encrypted

We have Domain Admin in your Active Directory



>>>>> We have Domain Admin in your Active Directory and bypassed your Privileged Access Management solution

If you don't pay the ransom, we will sell the privileged accounts of your corporate server network to the highest bidder on a darknet auction. Your time is running up and the earlier you pay, the higher the chance that no attacker group will utilize this access foothold.

To stop our running auction, transfer 75000 \$ in Bitcoin to the following address immediately:

If you are unsure how to acquire and transfer the require Bitcoin, follow the instructions here: https://www.bitcoin.com/get-started/how-to-buy-bitcoin/

4:45 Pl Second ra

increased 75000 \$ >>>>> What guarantee is there that we won't cheat you

We are the oldest ransomware affiliate program on the planet, nothing is more important than our reputation. We are not a politically motivated group, and we want nothing more than money. If you pay, we will stop the running auction and destroy the stolen data. After you pay the ransom, you will quickly make even more money. Treat this situation simply as a paid training for your system administrators, beacause it is due to your corporate network not being properly configured that we were able to attack you. Our pentest services should be paid just like you pay the salaries of your system administrators. Get over it and pay for it.


 (\cdots)

:10 PM

R doubts that the reat is real, still vestigation, we aintain full access

Don't think you can stop us...

5:15
IR not a compro and acomain fu



We noticed you disabled our foothold ... Try again...;)


We've re-enabled it ... Time is against you!





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


EXERCISE RESULTS

Post-mortem Analysis & Debriefing







CONCLUSION

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Comparison with Traditional Red Teaming

Both approaches have benefits and drawbacks, but different ones...

	Micro Attack Simulations	Traditional Red Teaming		
Scope	Focused on specific controls or processes	Broad, covers multiple attack vectors		
Duration Shorter, often days to weeks		Longer, often weeks to months		
Cost Generally lower & less resources		Generally higher & more resources		
Complexity	Lower complexity, less planning required	High complexity, extensive planning		
Skill Required May require specialized skills for specific controls		Requires diverse skill sets across multiple areas		
Objectives Validates specific security controls		Validates overall security posture		
Misses	Interrelated operation of security controls	Potential weak points behind initial posture		
Impact on Ops	Lower, less disruptive, less risk	Higher, more disruptive, more risk		
Realism	May not fully simulate real-world attacks	Aims to closely simulate real-world attacks		
Output	Detailed feedback on specific controls	General assessment of security readiness		
Reporting	More straightforward, focused, enhanced with Tree	Comprehensive, in-depth		
Adaptability Easier to adapt (other actors or controls) and repeat		May require significant changes for each iteration		

Offensive Security Landscape

Where do Micro Attack Simulations fit in?

 Vulnerability Scans
 VAPT
 Red Teaming
 Purple Teaming

Micro Attack Simulations

Simulate the Unsimulateable

Benefit of Micro Attack Simulations vs. Traditional Red Team Approach

ALERT

Malware Discovered in Popular NPM Package, ua-

parser-js


Last Revised: October 22, 2021

Versions of a popular NPM package named ua-parser-js was found to contain malicious code. ua-parser is used in apps and websites to discover the type of device or browser a person is using from User-Agent data. computer or device with the affected software installed or running could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information or take control of the system.

CISA urges users and administers using compromised ua-parser-js versions 0.7.29, 0.8.0, and 1.0.0 to update to the respective patched versions: 0.7.30, 0.8.1, 1.0.1

For more information, see Embedded malware in ua-parser-js.

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/10/22/malware-discovered-popular-npm-package-ua-parser-js



https://blog.aquasec.com/can-you-trust-your-vscode-extensions

Why opt for Micro Attack Simulations?

Gains & Advantages

Rapid Validation

- Quick turnaround time for security assessments
- > Immediate insights for improvements

Cost-Efficiency

- Less resource-intensive than full-scale Red Teaming
- Offers high ROI for small to medium-sized organizations

Tailored Approach


- Customized to focus on specific controls
- Flexibility in scaling up or down based on needs

Actionable Feedback

- Generates specific, quantifiable results
- Facilitates prioritized decision-making for resource allocation

Holistic View (Simulation + Tree)

- Integrates both technical and nontechnical controls
- Possibility to recalculate attack tree with broken controls marked as "failed"



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