

# Uncovering Hidden Threats: Intro to Kernel Debugging with WinDbg

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# Goal of the workshop

- To introduce the basics of kernel debugging with WinDbg, exploring kernel memory management, process structures, and demonstrating how to identify and exploit vulnerabilities using real-world examples.

# Agenda

- **Introduction to WinDbg**
- **WinDbg Interface Basics**
  - Key commands and GUI overview
- **Understanding Processes**
  - Processes, threads, tokens, and memory
- **Kernel Basics**
  - Explanation of the kernel, its role, and transition from user mode to kernel mode.
- **WinDbg Practice**
  - Viewing SSDT
  - Viewing process list
- **Real-world Exploit Example**
  - rtcore64.sys exploitation and PatchGuard issue
- **Final Demo**
  - Simplified exploit development


What is WinDbg?

# What is WinDbg?

- **Windows debugger**, used by Microsoft itself for user space and kernel debugging.


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- **WinDbg** from Debugging Tools (part of WinSDK)




# What is WinDbg?


- Windows debugger, used by Microsoft itself for user space and kernel debugging.
- WinDbg from Debugging Tools (part of WinSDK)



- **WinDbg Preview** from Microsoft Store (better UI and more features)




# GUI? Kind of...



Enter your commands here...




# GUI? Kind of...



Get your results here 😊


# GUI? Kind of...



**No Panic!**

**We will need only five base commands 😊**

# GUI? Kind of...




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- **Set breakpoint** **bp**

# GUI? Kind of...




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- Set breakpoint **bp**
- **Show stack trace** **k**

# GUI? Kind of...




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- Set breakpoint **bp**
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- **Unassemble** **u**

# GUI? Kind of...




No Panic!

We will need only five base commands 😊

- Set breakpoint bp
- Show stack trace k
- Unassemble u
- **Display memory** d\_

# GUI? Kind of...



No Panic!

We will need only five base commands 😊

- Set breakpoint bp
- Show stack trace k
- Unassemble u
- Display memory d\_
- **Arithmetic operations ?**

# What is a process?



A Windows **process** is an instance of a program with its own **memory space**, which contains its code, data, stack, heap, and other necessary **resources** for execution.



# What is a process?



An **executable image** is a file containing initial code, data, and other resources, usually in **.exe** or **.dll** format, that can be loaded into memory for execution by the operating system.

e.g., notepad.exe

# What is a process?



A **thread** is a single sequence of instructions within a process that can run independently, allowing multitasking within the process.

```
...  
FILE *file;  
int number;  
file = fopen("input.txt", "r");  
fscanf(file, "%d", &number);  
printf("%d\n", number);  
...
```

# What is a process?



A **process token** contains information like the user's **SID (Security Identifier)**, **group SIDs**, **privileges**, and **access rights**. It defines the security context of the process, determining what resources it can access.


# What is a process?




A **handle table** stores references to system resources (e.g., files, threads, registry keys) for a process, managing access to them.

Handle	Resource Type
0x4	File: "example.txt"
0x8	Thread ID: 1234
0xC	Mutex: "MyMutex"
0x10	Registry Key: HKCU\...
0x14	Socket: 192.168.1.1:80

# Process memory... like this?




# Virtual Memory



\* MMU – Memory Management Unit


# Virtual Memory (user mode)



\* The usage insights of physical address ranges can be obtained using the *RAMMap* tool from the Sysinternals Suite.


# Virtual Memory (user mode)

*Detects the invalid memory access since the address does not belong to the process's accessible address space*






# Virtual Memory (multiple processes)



\* in the diagram the MMU module is omitted, but it is implied

*Virtual addresses can map to different physical addresses across processes...*


# Virtual Memory (multiple processes)



\* in the diagram the MMU module is omitted, but it is implied

*... while different virtual addresses can also map to the same physical address for shared resources like system DLLs*

# Then, what is the kernel?




The **kernel** is the core of the operating system that manages memory, hardware through drivers, process scheduling, access management, and provides essential services to applications.

ntoskrnl.exe

kernel objects


e.g., hal.dll, disk.sys, etc.

# Then, what is the kernel?



\* The image for the kernel in the "System" process (PID 4) is primarily `C:\Windows\System32\ntoskrnl.exe`

# Then, what is the kernel?



# Transition to kernel mode

notepad.exe




System (PID 4)



# Transition to kernel mode

notepad.exe




..... WinAPI (kernel32.dll)

System (PID 4)



# Transition to kernel mode

notepad.exe




System (PID 4)





# Transition to kernel mode

notepad.exe



..... WinAPI (kernel32.dll)

..... Native API (ntdll.dll) .....


the **last layer** in user space before transitioning to kernel mode

System (PID 4)



# Transition to kernel mode

notepad.exe



..... WinAPI (kernel32.dll)

..... Native API (ntdll.dll) .....

..... **Jump to kernel**


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System (PID 4)



# Transition to kernel mode

notepad.exe




..... WinAPI (kernel32.dll)

..... Native API (ntdll.dll) .....

..... Jump to kernel


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System (PID 4)



# Transition to kernel mode

notepad.exe




..... WinAPI (kernel32.dll)

..... Native API (ntdll.dll) .....

..... Jump to kernel


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System (PID 4)




# Transition to kernel mode

notepad.exe



..... Received a handle for file.txt!

System (PID 4)



# WinDbg practice: Attach to process

- Launch notepad.exe
- Launch WinDbg Preview
  1. File
  2. Start debugging
  3. Attach to process
  4. Select process
  5. Attach

The screenshot shows the WinDbg 1.2407.24003.0 interface. On the left, the 'File' menu is open, with a red arrow labeled '1' pointing to it. The 'Start debugging' menu item is highlighted with a red arrow labeled '2'. The 'Attach to process' option is highlighted with a red arrow labeled '3'. A table of processes is displayed, with a red arrow labeled '4' pointing to 'Notepad.exe'. The 'Attach' button is highlighted with a red arrow labeled '5'.

Process	PID	Platform
ONENOTE.EXE	19276	X64
Notepad.exe	26356	X64
ONENOTEM.EXE	12272	X64

# WinDbg practice: Set a breakpoint

The screenshot shows the WinDbg interface with the following components:

- Command Window:** Contains the command `0:036> bp createfilew`, which is highlighted with a red box. A red arrow labeled '1' points to this command.
- Breakpoint List:** Shows a list of loaded modules with their addresses and names. A red arrow labeled '2' points to the 'Break' button in the 'Flow Control' group, which is used to set the breakpoint.
- Threads Window:** Shows a single thread named 'Notepad+0xc4e10 (00007f...)' with TID 0x1e00 and Index 0x0.
- Locals and Watch Windows:** Both are currently empty.

- Notepad pauses when WinDbg attaches
  1. Set a breakpoint
  2. Continue execution

# WinDbg practice: Hit a breakpoint

The screenshot shows the WinDbg interface with the following components:

- Command Window:** Shows the command sequence: `0:036> bp de833e20 cc int 3`, `0:036> g`, and `0:010> u`. The `u` command is highlighted with a red box and a red arrow labeled [2].
- Disassembly Window:** Shows the disassembly of the `0:010` instruction. The instruction `00007ffe`de050460 ff250a410600 jmp qword ptr [KERNEL32!_imp_CreateFileW (00007ffe`de0b4570)]` is highlighted with a red box and a red arrow labeled 1. Below it, the instruction `00007ffe`de050466 cc int 3` is also highlighted with a red box.
- Breakpoint Hit Message:** A message box says "Breakpoint 0 hit" and "KERNEL32!CreateFileW:", which is highlighted with a red box.
- Locals Window:** Shows a table with columns "Name" and "Value".
- Threads Window:** Shows a table with columns "TID", "Index", and "Thread". The thread "Notepad+0xc4e10 (00007f..." is listed.

- Open a file or create a new tab in notepad
  1. Breakpoint is hit!
  2. [Disassemble instructions at the current address to show the assembly code of **CreateFileW**]
- **CreateFileW** doesn't directly interact with the kernel, so we set a new breakpoint at ntdll's **NtCreateFile**



# WinDbg practice: Get syscall number

2


```
Command
00007ffe`de05046b cc          int     3
00007ffe`de05046c cc          int     3
0:010> bp ntcreatefile ← 1
0:010> g
Breakpoint 2 hit ← 3
ntdll!NtCreateFile:
00007ffe`de830bc0 4c8bd1      mov     r10,rcx
0:010> u ← 4
ntdll!NtCreateFile:
00007ffe`de830bc0 4c8bd1      mov     r10,rcx
00007ffe`de830bc3 b855000000  mov     eax,55h ← 5
00007ffe`de830bc8 f604250803fe7f01 test    byte ptr [SharedUserData+0x308 (00000000`7ffe0308)],1
00007ffe`de830bd0 7503       jne    ntdll!NtCreateFile+0x15 (00007ffe`de830bd5)
00007ffe`de830bd2 0f05      syscall ← 6
00007ffe`de830bd4 c3         ret
```

Name	Value
------	-------

TID	Index	Thread
0x1e00	0x0	Notepad+0xc4e10 (00007f...


1. Sets a breakpoint at the **NtCreateFile** function in **ntdll.dll**
2. Continue execution
3. Breakpoint at **NtCreateFile** is hit!
4. Disassemble instructions at the current address to show the assembly code of **NtCreateFile**
5. Get syscall number: look for the **mov eax, 55h** instruction, which loads the **syscall number (0x55)** into the **EAX** register
6. The **syscall** instruction triggers the transition to **kernel mode**

# WinDbg practice: Step over




1. The **"Step Over"** action proceeds to the next instruction without entering functions
2. After stepping over, the debugger shows the next instruction to be executed: **mov eax, 55h**. This sets the syscall number (**0x55**) in the **EAX** register, which the kernel uses to **identify the NtCreateFile request**

# WinDbg practice: Step into



1. "Step Over" until the syscall instruction
2. When the **syscall** is about to execute, try to "Step Into" to attempt to observe what happens inside the kernel
3. The kernel code cannot be stepped into in user-mode debugging; "Step Into" behaves like "Step Over" in WinDbg because it **does not transition into kernel-mode code during user-mode debugging**

# System Calls: User to Kernel Mode



- **System calls** act as "**gateways**" from user mode to kernel mode, enabling applications to request services from the operating system
- **Synchronous vs. Asynchronous:** Regular syscalls **wait for completion**, while various options allow **non-blocking behavior**
- Syscall Reference Guide: <https://j00ru.vexillium.org/syscalls/nt/64/>

# Intro to kernel debugging

WinDbg can operate in either user mode or kernel mode, but **not in both simultaneously**.

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**Local kernel debugging**

**Remote kernel debugging**

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**Local kernel debugging**

**Remote kernel debugging** (*over network, USB, 1394, and serial connections*)


# Intro to kernel debugging

WinDbg can operate in either user mode or kernel mode, but not in both simultaneously.

## Local kernel debugging

 View kernel objects (*reliable with restrictions*)

## Remote kernel debugging (*over network, USB, 1394, and serial connections*)

 View kernel objects



# Intro to kernel debugging

WinDbg can operate in either user mode or kernel mode, but not in both simultaneously.

## Local kernel debugging

- 🙄 View kernel objects (*reliable with restrictions*)
- 🙄 Cannot use breakpoints

## Remote kernel debugging (*over network, USB, 1394, and serial connections*)

- 😊 View kernel objects
- 😊 Set breakpoints

# Intro to kernel debugging

WinDbg can operate in either user mode or kernel mode, but not in both simultaneously.

## Local kernel debugging

- 🙄 View kernel objects (*reliable with restrictions*)
- 🙄 Cannot use breakpoints
- 😊 Only one host is needed

## Remote kernel debugging (*over network, USB, 1394, and serial connections*)

- 😊 View kernel objects
- 😊 Set breakpoints
- 🙄 Requires two hosts

# Intro to kernel debugging

WinDbg can operate in either user mode or kernel mode, but not in both simultaneously.

**Local kernel debugging**  **Let's try this for now**

- 🙄 View kernel objects (*reliable with restrictions*)
- 🙄 Cannot use breakpoints
- 😊 Only one host is needed

**Remote kernel debugging** (*over network, USB, 1394, and serial connections*)

- 😊 View kernel objects
- 😊 Set breakpoints
- 🙄 Requires two hosts

# WinDbg practice: VM preparations

If using own Windows 11 VM:

- **Disable secure boot** in VM settings  
*VMWare: Settings → Options → Advanced → UEFI → Uncheck “Enable secure boot”*
- Start VM, run cmd.exe as an Administrator and **enable debugging** by entering:  
*bcdedit /set debug on*  
*You should get “The operation completed successfully.”*
- Install **WinDbg Preview** from Microsoft Store
- Enjoy!

Alternatively download preconfigured VM from <https://tinyurl.com/axkc9txy>

# WinDbg practice: Attach to kernel

# WinDbg practice: View SSDT


# WinDbg practice: View Process List

# Real-world example

*We possessed a low-privileged user account*

Client.exe

Legit read/write  
in kernel buffer



Stores sensitive data in  
kernel space (**secure**)



# Real-world example


The screenshot shows Process Explorer with the 'System' process selected. The 'Handles' pane at the bottom lists loaded DLLs, with 'RTCore64.sys' highlighted by a red box and an arrow.

Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description	Company Name
Secure System		184 K	23,324 K	76		
Registry		15,408 K	45,200 K	124		
System Idle Process	85.35	60 K	8 K	0		
System	1.34	36 K	148 K	4		
Interrupts	0.33	0 K	0 K	n/a	Hardware Interrupts and DPCs	
smss.exe		1,116 K	1,108 K	416		
Memory Compression		780 K	171,872 K	1440		
csrss.exe		2,004 K	4,864 K	556		
wininit.exe		1,524 K	6,052 K	656		
services.exe		5,288 K	9,420 K	780		
svchost.exe		9,748 K	29,156 K	972	Host Process for Windows S...	Microsoft Corporati

Name	Description	Company Name
rdyboost.sys	ReadyBoost Driver	Microsoft Corporation
rspndr.sys	Link-Layer Topology Responder Dr...	Microsoft Corporation
<b>RTCore64.sys</b>		
spaceport.sys	Storage Spaces Driver	Microsoft Corporation

# Real-world example



Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [WINDEV2407EVAL\User]

File Options View Process Find Users DLL Help


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Handles DLLs Threads


Name	Description	Company Name
rdyboost.sys	ReadyBoost Driver	Microsoft Corporation
rspndr.sys	Link-Layer Topology Responder Dr...	Microsoft Corporation
RTCore64.sys		
spaceport.sys	Storage Spaces Driver	Microsoft Corporation

The **RTCore64.sys** driver is part of the MSI Afterburner and RivaTuner software packages. This driver provides **low-level hardware access for monitoring and overclocking features** on a Windows system, specifically for graphics cards.


# Real-world example



# Real-world example



# CVE-2019-16098



The image shows a browser window displaying the CVE-2019-16098 page on the CVEdetails.com website. The browser's address bar shows the URL <https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16098/>. The website's navigation bar includes a search bar with the placeholder text "CVE id, product, vendor..." and a "Log in" button. The main content area features a sidebar on the left with a "Vulnerabilities" section containing links for "By Date", "By Type", "Known Exploited", "Assigners", "CVSS Scores", "EPSS Scores", and "Search". The main content area displays the title "Vulnerability Details : CVE-2019-16098" and a detailed description of the vulnerability. The description states that the driver in Micro-Star MSI Afterburner 4.6.2.15658 (aka RTCore64.sys and RTCore32.sys) allows any authenticated user to read and write to arbitrary memory, I/O ports, and MSRs. This can be exploited for privilege escalation, code execution under high privileges, and information disclosure. These signed drivers can also be used to bypass the Microsoft driver-signing policy to deploy malicious code. Below the description, the publication and update dates are listed: "Published 2019-09-11 17:15:11 Updated 2021-07-21 11:39:24 Source MITRE". There are also links to view the vulnerability at "NVD" and "CVE.org". At the bottom, the vulnerability category is listed as "Memory Corruption", "Gain privilege", and "Information leak".

Documentation  Log in

**CVEdetails.com**  
powered by SecurityScorecard

▼ Vulnerabilities

- By Date
- By Type
- Known Exploited
- Assigners
- CVSS Scores
- EPSS Scores
- Search

## Vulnerability Details : CVE-2019-16098

The driver in Micro-Star MSI Afterburner 4.6.2.15658 (aka RTCore64.sys and RTCore32.sys) allows any authenticated user to read and write to arbitrary memory, I/O ports, and MSRs. This can be exploited for privilege escalation, code execution under high privileges, and information disclosure. These signed drivers can also be used to bypass the Microsoft driver-signing policy to deploy malicious code.

Published 2019-09-11 17:15:11 Updated 2021-07-21 11:39:24 Source [MITRE](#)

View at [NVD](#), [CVE.org](#)

Vulnerability category: [Memory Corruption](#) [Gain privilege](#) [Information leak](#)

# Real-world example

Supply any address in the range  
**0xFFFF0800'00000000** -  
**0xFFFFFFFF'FFFFFFFF** for  
read/write... and **it works** 😳

Client.exe

Legit read/write  
in kernel buffer




# Real-world example

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DeviceIoControl()


Legit read/write  
in kernel buffer

Client.exe



# First idea

Rewrite the token of current process with the token of System process for **privilege escalation**



*It is possible to get the pointer to System process out of user space, more information here:*

[Exploring the Windows kernel using vulnerable driver - Part 2 - Ring 0x00 \(idafchev.github.io\)](https://github.com/idafchev/Exploring-the-Windows-kernel-using-vulnerable-driver-Part-2-Ring-0x00)



# PatchGuard


Rewrite the token of current process with the token of System process for privilege escalation



DeviceIoControl()

Client.exe

Legit read/write in kernel buffer



**PatchGuard** prevents **unauthorized kernel modifications**, including changes to the SSDT, IDT, GDT, and process token structures, in 64-bit Windows systems.

# Hmm...


Need to do something without triggering PatchGuard...




`DeviceIoControl()`

Legit read/write in kernel buffer


Client.exe



# Hmm...???



# Hmm...???



# PatchGuard

Read memory space of **CustomDriver.sys**, thus extracting sensitive data



`DeviceIoControl()`

Client.exe

Legit read/write in kernel buffer




RTCore64.sys


CustomDriver.sys

Ntfs.sys

...



# PatchGuard



# PatchGuard

Read memory space of **CustomDriver.sys**, thus extracting sensitive data

Client.exe

Full code of the exploit is available here: [ExploitRTCore64](#)

Legit read/write in kernel buffer

`DeviceIoControl()`



**Sensitive data got leaked via vulnerability in the third-party driver**

# Final demo

Developing simplified exploit on reading System process's token



# Summary

- In this session, we covered the fundamentals of kernel debugging with WinDbg, explored the Windows process and memory model, and dived into real-world kernel exploitation scenarios.
- By understanding the internal workings of the kernel and utilizing tools like WinDbg, we can effectively identify and explore potential security vulnerabilities.
- Remember, responsible handling of kernel-level access and knowledge of protections like PatchGuard are crucial in maintaining system integrity.